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ABSTRACT 
Super Bowls are one of the world’s premier sporting events, bringing hundreds of 
thousands of event participants, vendors, and fans to host cities. They are high-stakes, 
planned events that require the same elements of focus, all-hazard orientation, 
coordination, trust, collaboration, and unity of purpose that the homeland security 
environment requires in order to achieve the goals set forth in the Presidential Directives. 
This thesis considers the predictable performance activities in the planning process that 
lead to predictable performance outcomes. Large-event planners and operators can 
benefit from understanding these activities and implementing preventive steps that lead to 
more desirable event outcomes. By establishing a cooperative and highly participative SB 
planning process, the majority of operational conflicts (whether cultural or technical) will 
be uncovered in a controlled way and lead toward more predictable performance 
outcomes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: SUPER BOWL: A PLANNED HOMELAND 
SECURITY EVENT 
The primary goal of terrorism is to disrupt society by provoking intense 
fear and shattering all sense of personal and community safety. The target 
is an entire nation, not only those who are killed, injured or even directly 
affected. 
Hall, Norwood, Ursano, Fullerton, and Levinson, 2002 
A. SETTING THE STAGE 
In 1967, the first Super Bowl was played at Los Angeles Memorial Stadium in 
California. What initially began as a deciding game between two rival leagues (the NFL 
and its then-rival league, the American Football League) in a “Super game” would soon 
become the most watched sporting event annually in the world (Sports Illustrated, 1967). 
Sixty-two thousand fans attended the game with an estimated 26 million television 
viewers. These numbers would ultimately pale in comparison to the 200,000 fans and 98 
million viewers in 2008. Although the United States was entrenched in a war in Vietnam, 
there was little application of world politics, pandemics, or the threat of global or 
domestic terrorism in the planning of security for the game.  
Over the course of the subsequent 41 years, the world security environment would 
change dramatically, requiring a very high priority for event security. The events 
following 9/11 forced the review of security procedures worldwide. Sporting events with 
global appeal are an obvious terrorist target, as such attacks will attract the attention of 
the world to the particular terrorist cause. A tragic example of this is the capture and the 
subsequent murder of 11 Israeli Olympic team members at the 1972 Summer Olympics. 
Through these acts, members of the Palestinian group "Black September" sought the 
release of 200 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. The deaths of the Israeli athletes is 
regarded as one of the most significant terrorist acts ever committed prior to the 9/11 
attacks.  
Before 1972, the Olympics had not been the target of any terrorist activity. Sports 
event security was changed forever with the killing of the Israeli athletes at Munich. At 
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every games held since the 1972 Olympics, security has been a significant and highly 
visible presence. While terrorism on the level of the Munich killings has never been 
replicated at an international sporting event, a number of terrorist acts have been 
perpetrated with an indirect impact upon international sport. An example was the 
destruction of a Korean Airlines jet by a terrorist bomb in 1987. Investigation later 
revealed that the criminals intended to disrupt the lead-up to the 1988 Summer Olympics 
that was ultimately hosted by South Korea. In 1996, a bomb planted by a U.S. domestic 
terrorist was detonated in the Atlanta Games Olympic Park, with one person killed and 
over 100 injured. In 1997, the Olympic stadium in Stockholm was severely damaged by a 
terrorist bomb, planted by a group opposed to a Swedish bid for the 2004 Olympic 
Games, which was ultimately awarded to Athens. 
The 9/11 attacks served to further heighten security concerns, especially with 
respect to both the potential threat to American athletes competing abroad and the staging 
of events such as the Super Bowl on American soil. Teams representing the United States 
in events as diverse as the Ryder Cup golf championship and international tennis 
tournaments have been the subject of close security protection for this reason (Sports 
Security and Terrorism). 
B. THE “PERFECT STORM” FOR THE TERRORIST THREAT 
Modern Super Bowls offer analogous threat and vulnerability opportunities for 
domestic and international terrorist groups. Two key elements of terrorist intent include 
material damage to the enemy and political damage to the enemy (McCauley, 2007). The 
event possesses the political, social, and global elements that terrorists seek to gain 
notoriety. Modern U.S. pop culture considers the day on which the Super Bowl is played 
a de facto American national holiday, referring to it as “Super Bowl Sunday.” 
Commercial airtime for the Super Bowl broadcast is the most expensive of the year 
because of its high viewership. Dignitaries from U.S. and world pop culture and politics 
attend the weeklong events leading up to the finale, the game. 
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C. SCENARIOS OF CONCERN: IEDS OR SUICIDE BOMBERS  
According to DHS, the FBI, NCTC, NORTHCOM, and the local area law 
enforcement community who conduct the annual threat assessment for the Super Bowl, it 
is assessed that terrorists intent on attacking a stadium most likely would use one or more 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 
(VBIEDs). Such an attack during a major event would inflict immediate casualties and 
destruction as well as create fear and panic among survivors. Both are notorious goals of 
the terrorist mindset. Terrorists also could use IEDs or VBIEDs against crowded, 
unsecured targets nearby, such as local businesses and public parking lots, as a diversion 
or as secondary devices to kill and injure first responders. Such attacks would attract the 
extensive media attention most terrorists seek. 
The large number of contractors, media personnel, stadium employees, and 
vendors who will attend the Super Bowl offer opportunities for cover efforts by terrorists 
to gain access inside the stadium. Because stolen or counterfeit law enforcement badges 
and credentials purchased online are often of high quality and hard to differentiate from 
legitimate credentials, unauthorized access to critical event sites can occur. 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Successful or failed execution of a large-scale event plan is usually measured by 
the effective utilization of resources, operational efficiency, minimizing or controlling 
life safety, and asset or mission loss. Success in event or incident management is also 
measured, sometimes more heavily, by the degree of synergy or conflict among 
participants. Homeland security stakeholders have demonstrated the ability to work in 
partnership successfully during the planning of large-scale events. They have less 
experience or success in leveraging a successful planning experience into a 
“maintenance” relationship, sustaining smart practices and successful policies in between 
large-scale or annualized events, and exporting them to the next group or event. As a 
result, they frequently “start from scratch” with each event. Specific large-scale events 
such as the Super Bowl (SB) rely upon the translation of past event-planning lessons 
from year to year and locale to locale. The importance of maintaining proven successful 
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planning and response methods beyond the planned event into the unplanned 
environment cannot be overstated. The capture and sustainment of good relationships and 
practices would close the margin of error, conflict, rollout time, and costs (financial, 
physical, and human) day to day and provide a more favorable base to start from as 
annual SB planning efforts begin.  
Small-scale or everyday events rarely exhaust local responders’ resources or 
exceed their capabilities; they therefore do not necessarily need to coordinate, 
collaborate, or cooperate with anyone else on a daily basis. The absence of multiagency, 
multidisciplinary involvement in these smaller events reduces the opportunities for 
relationship building and truly comprehensive event management experiences. Large-
scale planned events and unplanned events are very different from small-scale events in 
scale and dynamic. Logistical, operational, financial, and administrative challenges grow 
exponentially with the size of an event or incident. So, too, do the likelihood of waste, 
duplication, redundancy, conflict, and disunity. In a good (successful) event plan, 
relationships among stakeholders develop such that trust increases, positive experiences 
and association build, agreed areas of responsibility become clear, and resources are 
maximized rather than wasted.  
Super Bowls are one of the world’s premier sporting events, bringing hundreds of 
thousands of event participants, vendors and fans to host cities. They are a constructed, 
mega-event environment that requires the close coordination of hundreds of agencies 
within a context of the modern homeland security–oriented event-planning paradigm. 
This condition requires the consideration of local, state, national, and international 
security issues from an “all-hazards” perspective. The stakeholders represented in the 
planning of Super Bowls include players with different and sometimes competing 
interests. This high-stakes, high-visibility condition almost mandates a multijurisdictional 
approach to the planning process.  
The Homeland Security vision as identified in the 2007 National Strategy reads: 
United States, through a concerted national effort that galvanizes 
the strengths and capabilities of Federal, State, local, and Tribal 
governments; the private and nonprofit sectors; and regions, communities, 
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and individual citizens—along with our partners in the international 
community—will work to achieve a secure Homeland that sustains our 
way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America (Homeland 
Security Council, 2007). 
 This passage similarly embodies the annual vision of the Super Bowl. That vision 
includes annually bringing employment, community development, host-city marketing 
opportunities, and quality of life enhancement to host cities in a safe and secure way 
(Super Bowl XLIII Host Committee). 
Sustainability and transferability of the coordination process from one SB to the 
next is an ongoing challenge within the public-safety culture. Within the current 
homeland security environment (HSE), it is common for agencies that have worked 
together previously to establish comprehensive plans and response models during large-
scale event planning to return to previous “bad” habits of independent operation and 
planning following the execution of the event. If one considers SB planning as a 
representative microcosm of the greater HSE, repeat SB host cities and those mentored 
by the previous year’s host cities could avoid “reinventing the wheel” by identifying the 
elements of success within these large-scale planned events and repeating them. In doing 
so, a bridge could be built between planned events and incident management to maintain 
relationships in the larger homeland security and public safety communities.  
Cooperative and receptive planning processes for expected large-scale events like 
the Super Bowl are key to the optimal performance of emergency first responders during 
the event. Central to this assertion is the fact that there are contributing factors to the 
sustainment of collaboration beyond or between planned events. These factors include 
such behavioral elements as leadership, trust, social capital, and felt need (Bertram, 
2008). Institutionalizing the collaborative process through structured and reinforced 
training in collaborative environments is critical to sustaining long-term performance that 
demonstrates teamwork, cooperation and partnership.  
Public safety personnel have a legendary history of tradition. Law enforcement 
and fire service cultures share many common attributes such as camaraderie, teamwork 
within agencies, and professional pride. It is these very qualities that may serve as a 
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fundamental barrier to collaboration. The very persons required to engage the major 
event planning process may not be equipped with the essential skills that lead to success. 
As Dr. Wollman of the Naval Postgraduate School blogged recently,  
a lot of the people who end up doing homeland security are not great at 
playing nicely or sharing. They are ride-to-the-rescue, shoot-first-ask-later 
heroic archetypes. Info sharing, mission sharing and toy sharing are 
turning out to be counterproductive because they are culturally anathema 
(Wollman, 2009).  
A consideration of psychological tenets by Sigmund Freud suggests a principle 
aspect of dysfunction in collaboration. He reasoned that  
An Ego governed by social convention and a Superego governed by moral 
values would successfully “censor” the Id, leading to mental health and 
public safety. We, on the other hand, give the Ego free rein, censor the 
Superego, and let the Id censor us, and then wonder why mental health 
and public safety keep eluding us (King, 2002).  
Interpreted within the context of public safety cultures, I suggest that ego may be 
the bedrock of dysfunction in the collaborative experience. 
The public safety dysfunction observed on September 11, 2001 can be viewed as 
a direct consequence of anticollaborative behaviors and structures. Subsequent federal 
guidelines focused on creating structure and incentives to share resources and create 
environments where the greatest likelihood of coordination of resources could be realized 
(Homeland Security Presidential Directive [HSPD] 5, 2003, and 8, 2005). HSPD-5 
requires DHS to lead a coordinated national effort with other federal departments and 
agencies and state, local, and tribal governments to establish a National Response Plan 
(NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS). Despite these directives, 
there are daily reminders of the lack of collaborative process in public safety, especially 
when those stakeholders are forced together to plan a large-scale event; time and 
resources are expended establishing relationships, trust, organizational arrangements, and 
division of labor with each event. Ideally, these issues could be settled once, and if the 
relationships were maintained between events, then efficiency and mission success would 
increase at the next event.  
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Super Bowls are high-stakes planned events that require the same elements of 
focus, all-hazard orientation, coordination, trust, collaboration, and unity of purpose that 
the homeland security environment (HSE) requires in order to achieve the goals set forth 
in the presidential directives. Super Bowl plan preparation and execution requires 
focusing on the same HSE priorities of defeating terrorist threats, hardening all venue 
locations from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) 
liabilities, assurance of intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection, mass 
casualty planning, and NIMS-compliant command and control (White House, 2010). 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
A basic premise of this thesis is the assumption that the planning process and 
execution of public safety procedures during Super Bowls closely resembles the 
preparation, prevention, and execution of Homeland Security programs and processes. 
Additionally, it is hypothesized that it is possible to forecast public safety operational 
performance during Super Bowls through well-organized and highly collaborative 
planning processes. As such, the primary research question is: How can the public safety 
community leverage successful planning processes to predict or improve performance 
outcomes in annual Super Bowl planning? Furthermore, it is proposed that a structural 
guide or template can be created that, if used, will establish the basis for successful 
operational outcomes during Super Bowl planning. Additional areas of inquiry include:  
1. What factors contribute to collaboration within SB planning either 
positively or negatively?  
2. What counts as a successful Super Bowl? 
3. How can organizations duplicate positive performance outcomes in 
planned event environments?  
4. Which of those conditions could be continued beyond the planned event? 
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F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research will contribute to current efforts in the national public safety and 
homeland security environments. Mass-gathering events like Super Bowls and incidents 
of national significance require committed coordination and partnership amongst 
stakeholder agencies and customers. The fact that interagency coordination is not always 
required during smaller events sometimes impedes coordination and often sets up barriers 
that must be overcome in large-scale event planning and response. The literature suggests 
that there are predictable performance activities in the planning process that lead to 
predictable performance outcomes. Large event planners and operators can benefit from 
understanding these activities and implementing preventive steps that lead to more 
desirable event outcomes. 
G. ARGUMENT: HYPOTHESIS, CLAIMS, AND CHALLENGES 
For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that there are technical, political, 
and cultural (disciplinary) factors that influence the outcome of Super Bowl planning. 
Technical elements of how public safety and homeland security operators carry out their 
mission must be identified and analyzed for crossover, duplication of effort, and 
conflicting procedures. Large-scale events and those of national significance involve 
many agencies. These agencies bring with them a variety of political concerns and 
agendas that must be managed thoughtfully as event plans are developed.  
Even large-scale events are local events regardless of the number of state and 
federal agencies that participate. Local political influences can be as challenging to the 
planning process as national ones. The willingness to participate in the planning process 
and oftentimes the operational outcome can weigh greatly on the perceived benefit to the 
stakeholders. Financial, political, and personal gain plays an important role in 
performance outcomes.  
The federal decision to tie grant funding to the completion of National Incident 
Management training brought historically absent public-safety participants together to 
learn and practice command and control methodology collaboratively. The challenge has 
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been to leverage the cumulative knowledge gained into reliable cooperative planning and 
operations during large-scale events such as Super Bowls. 
Institutional and organizationally cultivated cultural differences between public 
safety participants create obstacles that must be overcome or at least neutralized in order 
to effectively plan events. Understanding the planning participants’ needs and 
expectations offers the opportunity to fine tune the process to include their interests or to 
address alternatives in the process before the event occurs. Failure to do so risks 
performance outcomes. 
A cooperative and highly participative SB planning process will uncover the 
majority of operational conflicts (whether cultural or technical) in a controlled way and 
lead toward more predictable performance outcomes. Operational costs during Super 
Bowls can be greatly reduced through the elimination of barriers to interdisciplinary 
partnerships. The relationships established in the planned event or incident process can be 
a “force multiplier” when unplanned events occur. It is widely accepted that the incident 
is the worst place to pass out business cards that introduce key players to each other. 
H.  METHODOLOGY 
The specific question addressed in this thesis is; how can the public safety 
community leverage successful planning processes to predict or improve performance 
outcomes in annual Super Bowl planning? This analysis sought to contribute to the 
national discussion on major event planning and homeland security by evaluating and 
documenting instances in which the event planners utilized practices, procedures, and 
cooperative philosophy and diplomacy skills to create positive event outcomes.  
The approach utilized in this project engaged a two-step method of appreciative 
inquiry (Troxel). Finding out what works effectively and creating a planning design that 
concentrates on exceptional performance and minimizes ineffective performance was the 
motivation behind the research. The first step was to conduct structured interviews with 
subject-matter experts and practitioners within the National Football League and Super  
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Bowl host-city public safety representatives. By interviewing key contributors to the 
annual planning process, insight was gained into potential planning and performance 
factors impacting event outcomes. 
The second step consisted of a case study of Super Bowl XLII. This event was 
conducted in a post-9/11 planning environment where coordination and interdisciplinary 
play were highly prioritized. Examples of the challenges and successes that can comprise 
planning for such a mega-event were analyzed. This emphasis was in part due to the 
requirements that local, state, and federal agencies adhere to standardized event and 
incident management methods. (Within the curriculum of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) is included a Planning “P” where a methodical process of 
stakeholder briefing, review, and inclusion is requisite. NIMS-based planning establishes 
a structure for collaboration but does not guarantee it.) By assessing the selected case, 
greater insight was gained into the gaps in cooperation in events that fundamentally start 
from a structure of inclusion.  
Written After Action Reports, Concept of Operations documents, briefing notes, 
and Incident Action Plans for past Super Bowls were reviewed. Each of these events 
begins with the same basic priorities, as outlined by the NFL. How each local jurisdiction 
manages those event objectives can differ depending on the overall condition of the 
public safety and homeland security environment locally, nationally, and internationally. 
The analysis identified the process, procedural and behavioral elements that are 
consistent throughout the events. The results of the interviews and case study analysis 
were utilized to identify contributing factors that lead to successful event outcomes with 
the intent to ultimately develop a “how to” guide for large-event planners or responders 
that will narrow the path toward consistent performance. 
I. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The primary focus of this thesis is to determine if there are planning actions and 
behaviors that can be replicated in the planned environment that can reliably improve 
operational performance. Chapter II summarizes relevant literature for this research, 
focusing on definable actions, values, and behaviors that the first-responder community 
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exhibits within the planning setting. In Chapter III, research design and methodology 
used to gather data is delineated. Interview results from selected subject matter experts 
who serve as major decision makers within the National Football League’s major-event 
planning group are analyzed. This information was considered within the context of the 
case study presented in Chapter IV that highlights important factors related to large-event 
planning. In this chapter, examples of sustainable planning performance behaviors 
emerge and contribute to a template for future approaches to planning for mass-gathering 
events. 
Chapter IV details Super Bowl XLII, held in Glendale, Arizona, in 2008. This 
event was widely considered a model planning example by NFL and adjunct agencies 
(E. J. Klima, personal communication, 2008; F. Supovitz, personal communication, 
2008). Arizona fully embraced Super Bowl planning as a planned mega-event and 
utilized formalized NIMS structure to assure complete compliance with the national 
objectives related to homeland security. Arizona planners initiated several original 
methodologies related to planning structure, stakeholder involvement, event-plan 
synergy, and communications (both technology and process).  
Chapter V details the results of interviews and highlights major trends and 
observations from the respondents. Chapter VI draws conclusions and makes 
recommendations to first responders, planners, and policy makers in relation to 
establishing predictable performance outcomes during large-scale events and incidents. A 
strategic framework is offered to help stakeholders realize value from a defined planning 
structure (Bryson, 2004, p. 137). This “value proposition” will be offered, based on the 
findings of literature, interviews, and case-study research that will minimize planning 
surprises in the future. The study’s recommendations will culminate in the final chapter, 
Chapter VII, where future research is recommended.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much consideration has been given to the study of the cooperative sharing process 
within the Homeland Security Environment (HSE). Major-event planning requires the 
same dedication to the elements of collaborative preparation as the HSE. This literature 
review presents conceptual definitions of collaboration, discusses factors that influence 
interagency collaboration, and highlights proposed strategies needed to promote and 
sustain collaborative processes and behaviors. These factors are foundational in 
contemporary Super Bowl planning and Homeland Security preparedness and response 
efforts. 
A. THE CONCEPT OF COLLABORATION 
Prior to conducting a search of literature associated with sustaining behaviors in 
the collaborative environment, a functional definition of key terms is appropriate. 
Webster’s New World Dictionary defines collaboration as (1) to work together in some 
literary or scientific undertaking; (2) to cooperate with the enemy (Agnes, 2003). As 
applied to governmental operations, a more common and accepted definition of 
collaboration is “any joint activity by two or more organizations that is intended to 
produce more public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone” 
(Bardach, 2001, p. 45).  
While often used interchangeably, it is necessary to distinguish “coordination” 
from “collaboration” when dealing with multiple organizations. Interagency coordination 
is defined as “a specific form of collaboration that applies to particular cases or 
operations” (Waugh, 2003, p. 4). The difference between the two concepts is that 
collaboration occurs when multiple agencies perceive mutual benefit in working together, 
whereas coordination happens when a leader exercising authority over multiple 
organizations directs them to collaborate in order to accomplish a specified joint purpose. 
By contrast, collaboration is a cooperative effort by multiple organizations to work 
together to achieve a common objective. Seidman describes the collaborative climate as  
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one where “agencies are most likely to be willing to collaborate and network when they 
are agreed on common objectives, operate under the same laws and regulations, and do 
not compete for scarce resources” (Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
B. THE COLLABORATION IMPERATIVE 
The extent of damage left by the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 
operational failures revealed during Hurricane Katrina has left an American public with 
rising expectations for agencies responsible for securing the homeland against terrorist 
threats and natural disasters (Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 effectively created the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which called for the largest governmental restructuring since 
the 1940s, when the Department of Defense was formed after World War II. The HSA 
created a mammoth agency that included 22 existing federal government agencies and 
absorbed 180,000 employees into one entity. DHS was conceptualized from an effort to 
streamline and consolidate domestic security functions in order to deliver a unified 
response and prevention program toward possible terrorist attacks in the future. 
Expectations weigh heavily on DHS. In addition to providing efficient and timely 
response to a terrorist attack, DHS also exists to provide a proactive defense strategy for 
the United States. DHS is also mandated to “to provide the unifying core for the vast 
national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to secure our 
nation” from threats of man-made hazards and natural disasters (United States 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2007). The coalescence and restructuring of 
efforts, programs, and functions have meant significant challenges for DHS (Kamarck, 
2004).  
One of its biggest challenges is how to establish a new set of interorganizational 
relationships that tie together a myriad of stakeholders: federal, state, and local 
governments, private and nonprofit sectors. Since the concept of homeland security has 
shifted from a purely federal responsibility to a national responsibility, public/private-
sector citizen partnerships are considered critical. This perspective led to the creation of 
the National Response Plan (NRP), which replaced the previous related Federal Response 
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Plan (FRP). In January 2008, the NRP was replaced by the National Response 
Framework (NRF). The NRF requires the partnership of government, private and 
nonprofit organizations, and communities. In order to ensure compatibility in action 
across numerous government levels, the NRF is complemented in practice by the 
National Incident Management System (GAO, 2004).  
Homeland security depends fundamentally on strengthening the ability of first 
responders to cope with rare and extreme events (Kettl, 2003). First responders are 
defined as “individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the 
protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including 
emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, as well as Emergency Management, Public Health, Clinical Care, Public Works, 
and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate 
support services during prevention, response, and recovery operations” (United States 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p. 3). 
The imperative to collaborate is based on need and legal compliance. No single 
governmental entity or agency is equipped to respond to all possible incidents—
especially large-scale incidents—that might occur within its area of jurisdiction. Mutual 
aid relationships and other intergovernmental arrangements for emergency preparedness 
and response are vital to accomplish a governmental entity’s preparedness obligations 
(Abbott & Hetzel, 2006). A unified system of interacting agencies and jurisdictions will 
be more flexible in adapting to internal and external threats in a given region as compared 
to separate, uncoordinated efforts by agencies acting independently to meet the same 
challenges (Clarke & Chenoweth, 2006).  
Intergovernmental and interdisciplinary cooperation is also required by 
legislation. The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) specifically explains that “states 
are encouraged to employ regional approaches to planning and preparedness and to adopt 
regional response structures whenever appropriate” to meet identified homeland security 
needs (DHS, 2004a, p. 35). States are also mandated to report the establishment and 
maintenance of mutual aid agreements to the ODP. Moreover, legislation was introduced 
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in the 108th Congress mandating intergovernmental and interdisciplinary cooperation, 
and encouraging regional cooperation and preparedness efforts (Abbott & Hetzel, 2006). 
Major emergency incidents require the coordinated efforts of first responders, 
government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. The importance of 
effective interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in 
developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response is always 
emphasized (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007). 
C. COLLABORATIVE DRIVERS 
In investigating how collaborative partnerships can be properly implemented to 
derive efficiency from first responder and other responsible agencies, understanding what 
drives collaboration must be explored.  
Literature suggests that leadership orientation, ideology, and motivation are key 
factors influencing the collaborative process among multiple organizations working 
toward homeland security goals, emergency preparedness, and disaster management. 
More specifically, leadership strategies can either enhance or undermine the efforts of 
first responders in dealing with disasters, and the lack of motivation among first 
responders or participating agencies can hinder the drive to collaborate. In addition, 
studies suggest that appropriate shifts in leadership style may foster collaborative 
capacity among organizations, promote inter-organizational coordination, and unity of 
effort. 
The role of leadership is crucial in fostering collaborative partnerships among 
multiple agencies (Kaplan & Godoy, 2008). Unified team efforts can be attained by 
inspiring team motivation (Christie, 2004). Visible leadership is essential in creating 
motivation among members by articulating a “felt need” through the interpretation and 
emphasis on the importance of activation triggers. When the urgency and importance of 
collaborating for a common objective is not properly communicated and articulated by 
leadership, a shared vision or felt need is absent, and teamwork becomes challenging. 
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Leadership, communication, established strategic goals, and timeliness all contribute to 
the human capability to effectively work together (Abbott & Hetzel, 2006).  
Kaplan & Godoy (2008) promote the theory that creating joint alignment starts 
with founding a joint core strategic vision that effectively communicates the joint 
commander’s intent and maps out actionable and quantifiable joint mission objectives 
with clear performance goals. Developing a weak vision inevitably leads to poor 
collaboration and a leadership team that fails to identify critical points of failure. The 
success of a large, diverse, and geographically dispersed organization like DHS requires 
alignment around a common language, common management process, and common 
leadership expectations (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007). Similarly, Curda 
(2006) identifies strong leadership and a clear rationale for all collaborating parties as 
requisites for any successful interagency effort.  
Motivators for the collaborative process will be affected by shifting national 
priorities. A diminished U.S. economy will result in the reorientation of individuals, 
municipalities, and state governments toward basic services; this may reduce the desire to 
work together at the expense of immediate or individually prioritized needs. One might 
assume that collaboration and sharing of resources would be a higher priority precisely 
because of the economic downturn. But, as J. Gillies, of the Gerald R. Ford School of 
Public Policy, revealed in an e-mail conversation, obvious problems remain: 
One that strikes me as crucial is collaboration in what might be called the 
post-GWOT imminent threat environment, say from 2009 to three years 
from now, where terrorism and homeland security has been downgraded 
in terms of national importance, certainly less important than the 
economy, and maybe even less than domestic social programs. Unless 
another focusing event occurs in the near future, the overarching 
homeland security mission can easily become drowned out again, if it has 
not already. And we return to that ingrained turf protection at all levels 
and in all homeland security-related agencies, where collaboration then 
becomes a last resort (personal electronic communication to author, 2009). 
Reports also find that joint organizational structures necessary for interagency 
collaboration in today’s constantly changing threat environment are of vital importance 
(Curda, 2006). In line with the threats posed by international terrorism, where the enemy 
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is performing at a faster pace than prevention and response tactics, joint organizational 
structures effectively and easily facilitate alignment, allocate resources, and accelerate 
flow of information. Traditional hierarchical structures are too rigid to bring this desired 
structure about.  
Studies propose that leadership models must shift toward those that blend 
different cultures and structures to facilitate the existence of collaboration among 
numerous organizations (Kettl, 2003; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wise, 2006). While 
command and control leadership may be the appropriate approach during urgent disaster 
response, a flexible leadership approach is necessary to accommodate changing events 
and circumstances (Wise, 2006). Since key collaborative values such as cooperation and 
transparency are not inherent in the hierarchical military model, the effectiveness of the 
“command and control model” has been criticized (Granot, 1999; Gray, 1989). 
There is evidence to suggest that centralized, response-oriented, and less 
collaborative homeland security-style emergency management impedes the timeliness 
and effectiveness of disaster response, especially in catastrophic events, such as 
Hurricane Katrina. Centralized decision making delays the approval and dispatch of 
assistance and complicates communication between federal officials on the ground and 
their Washington chiefs. A popular illustration is when FEMA official Marty Bahamonde 
had to ride out of the storm in New Orleans to report emergency conditions at the 
Superdome to FEMA director Michael Brown (Lipton, 2005). After Action Reports and 
studies also indicate serious communication problems between and among first-responder 
agencies and federal officials (United States House of Representatives, 2006; Waugh & 
Streib, 2006). 
In the realm of disaster management, Quarantelli (1993) believes that the 
elements present in good disaster planning require abandoning the traditional hierarchical 
model. Taking a generic approach to planning, pursuing a “command and control” 
scheme, and emphasizing “war stories” rather than research and concrete data. He argues 
that good disaster planning is the coordination of emergent resources rather than a 
centralized “command and control” leadership.  
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Creativity and innovation are values required for successful interagency efforts 
(Moe, 1989; Kaplan & Godoy, 2008). Leadership that catalyzes collaborative processes 
needs to be “employee-centric, leadership-focused, and process-centric, driven to 
challenge conventional thinking and with a license … to champion 
imaginative/innovative processes and ideas” (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 
2007, p. 13). 
D. BUILDING COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
The literature on collaborative capacity discusses unity of effort, information 
sharing, and the prioritization of conflict resolution as common ingredients of effective 
large-scale event planning or response (Kettl, 2003; Homeland Security Advisory 
Council, 2007; Stockton & Roberts, 2007; Ink, 2006).  
1. Unity of Effort  
Unity of effort is defined as “the coordination and cooperation by the disparate 
partners in homeland security to accomplish mutually agreed objectives” (Stockton & 
Roberts, 2007, p. 2). It is acknowledged that ability to coordinate effort is institutionally 
and structurally very hard to accomplish. There is consensus that effective unity of effort 
will occur only when stakeholders in homeland security (federal, state, local, and private 
sector) participate in formulating shared goals and agree on how to accomplish them 
(Kettl, 2003; Buntin, 2005; Stockton & Roberts, 2007).  
The Cultural Task Force (CTF) commissioned by the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council (2007) asserts that homeland security requires team effort from various 
sectors (appointees, career employees, contractors, citizens, state, local and tribal 
governments, schools, and the private sector) to create, execute, and continuously 
improve upon and sustain effective homeland security policies and operational 
capabilities.  
Donald Kettl (2003) opines that first-responder agencies recognize the need for 
improved coordination but are unwilling to surrender autonomy to make it possible.  
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Stockton & Roberts (2007) find two major barriers in federal and regional 
coordination efforts. One is the apparent role confusion due to disagreement over the 
definition of homeland security and the scope of its mission. Many government officials 
interpret the mission of homeland security as one that encompasses terrorism exclusively 
and eliminates natural hazards. This definition of homeland security exacerbates the 
already difficult task of building unity of effort at the federal and state levels. A second 
problem is identifying the priorities that need to drive homeland security. Using 
arguments from Stephen Flynn’s The Edge of Disaster (2007) and Charles Perrow’s The 
Next Catastrophe (2007), policymakers are advised to give more emphasis on threats 
apart from terrorism, such as industrial accidents and major incidents involving critical 
U.S. infrastructure.  
2. Information Sharing 
Another crucial ingredient to promoting collaboration in order to leverage 
performance outcomes of first-responder agencies and HSE stakeholders is effective 
communication through improved information sharing (Bean, 2009). Further, active 
communication among stakeholders within the HSE, in the form of formal and informal 
associations or consortiums, improves the atmosphere for collaboration (Stephenson, 
2003).  
The September 11 terrorist attacks caused an increase in public attention on and 
clamor for the need to improve information sharing among intelligence, emergency 
management, and law enforcement agencies. The investigative report of the Joint Inquiry 
of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees (United States House of Representative 
& United States Senate, 2002, p. ix) indicates that “one of the most significant problems 
examined during the open hearings was the lack of information sharing between 
agencies.” This was reiterated in the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report, which stated that 
“the biggest impediment to all-source analysis, to a greater likelihood of connecting the 




2003, p. 416). As a result of these congressional inquiries, agencies were recommended 
to provide an incentive system for sharing and to build a better balance between security 
and shared knowledge.  
Pelfey discusses how information sharing can lead to increased preparedness and 
response, saying that “if … information sharing is effective, threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities can be effectively identified, targets can be appropriately hardened, and 
suspects identified while an event is still in its inchoate stage” (Hagen, 2006, p. 9). As 
organizations become more complex in structure, so does their need for 
interorganizational networking. In a gigantic network such as the HSE, the basic 
assumption is that no single individual has a comprehensive view of the problem, but 
rather each member of the network has possible insight and a responsibility to act on the 
most accurate information available.  
Engaging domestic and international allies as a matter of U.S. government 
practice is also key to fostering a true information-sharing relationship (Carafano & 
Weitz, 2007). An atmosphere of organizational trust is an important element for 
sustaining that collaboration. Establishing trust in public safety personnel “can create 
willing acceptance and desired responsibility in the work group” (Abrashoff, 2002, 
p. 63). 
3. Conflict Resolution 
Considerations of organizational dysfunction and conflict inevitably play a role in 
the discussion of effective team play. Structural dysfunctions are intrinsic in a 
Department of Homeland Security that oversees more than 22 agencies with the 
expectation of synergy (Gillies, 2005).  
Structural and ideological differences among partner organizations hurt 
collaborative capacity. Hocevar, Jansen, & Thomas (2004) identify incompatibilities in 
tactics, techniques and procedures, rules of engagement, formalization of behaviors, and 
communication systems as risk factors in the development of collaborative capacity and 
mutual trust. To address these incompatibilities, leadership and staff must be able to 
 22
identify and analyze critical points of interface among standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) in order to maximize collaborative capacity. Minimal levels of training are 
therefore necessary to implement even the simplest and most routine standard processes.  
Resolving jurisdictional authority issues is a required part of responsible event 
planning but it is central to much of the conflict that occurs prior to and during events or 
incident. Jurisdictional resolution has to be paired with operational efficiency. 
Complacency is one of the most dangerous factors that lead to performance deficiencies 
during event operations. Casual, careless, or outright negligent approaches to the 
preparation and execution of plans are common contributors to dysfunction in 
performance behaviors (Klima, 2008). Investments in relationship building, 
understanding jurisdictional and disciplinary needs, and authorities must be paired with 
operational efficiencies in order to establish the expectation and opportunity for success 
in major event planning. 
E. CULTURE FACTORS IN COLLABORATION 
How human beings interrelate should be considered in exploring large event 
planning. Social and cultural mores cannot be discounted. Building collaborative capacity 
is a core concept, but difficult to implement as we consider human behavior (Burch, 
2007).  
Organizational culture and norms are potential barriers for collaboration (Gray, 
1989; Williams, 2002). Institutional disincentives hinder participation in networking or 
collaborative efforts. Strong advocacy can prevent stakeholders from finding common 
ground or consensus-building. Participation in collaborative efforts is sometimes viewed 
as a drain on time and valuable resources. Histories of conflict or bitter relationships 
among stakeholders make collaboration extremely difficult to achieve. Moreover, when 
member organizations perceive power disparities, encouraging collaboration is 
challenging. Parties may even feel that they will gain more if they opt not to collaborate. 
Societal cultural norms may work against collaboration (Williams, 2002; Lowe & 
Fothergill, 2003). Predominant individualistic culture in the United States can be a barrier  
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to collaboration. Variations in perceived amount of risk may necessarily lead to very 
different problem definitions and solution identification and may make collaboration 
difficult.  
Organizational culture may also hinder effective communication across 
boundaries of organizations. In discussing the role of technology in promoting improved 
information sharing, MacCoby concludes that the “easy part was to install 
communication technology. The hard part was getting people to communicate in a timely 
way” (MacCoby, 2006, p. 9). MacCoby contends that creating a culture of collaboration 
is more important than reorganization efforts needed to make interoperability work. 
Developing collaborative culture and training first responders in becoming collaborative 
leaders would lead to improved disaster-management outcomes (MacCoby, 2006).  
Conflicts in organization culture have significant impacts in disaster relief and 
management efforts. Culture conflict in the public/private sector sphere as well as among 
hierarchical governmental organizations, specifically law enforcement and the military, 
has proven to be a major impediment to the effective coordination of disaster relief 
operations (Waugh 2003; Waugh, 2004). To achieve collaboration effectively across 
organizations, cultural sensitivity and a common language are critical elements. 
Nevertheless, even when efforts are made to break down barriers, conflicts remain 
inevitable because some organizations are simply unable or unwilling to work with others 
(Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
Trust is another concern that needs to be explored in examining ways to leverage 
and sustain successful interagency collaboration. Trust is a critical factor facilitating 
collaboration, particularly in the realm of information sharing. Thomas (1979, p. 219) 
argues that “collaboration requires trust in the other party, trust in the other’s information 
and trust that the other will not exploit oneself.” Empirical research affirms and extends 
this argument. Walton & McKersie (1965) view trust as a value that encourages 
interdependent individuals and groups to eliminate fear of exploitation and recognize 
existing conflicts. Deutsch (1962) views trust as a factor that leads interdependent groups 
to display more cooperative behaviors. 
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Cross-functional collaboration over financial and human resource allocation is 
often based on trust (Davis & Lawrence, 1977; Thomas, 1979; Lorenz, 1992). Davis and 
Lawrence (1977, p. 107) conclude that trust enhances cross-functional collaboration “by 
encouraging individuals and groups to rely on one another and to accept each other’s 
judgments when these are based on unique competence and knowledge.”  
Trust is essential as effective crisis management depends on open communication 
channels among hierarchical levels and across divisional units (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). 
Several factors hinder the development of trust among cooperating agencies. Curda 
(2006) sees situations where collaboration is externally driven, as by congressional 
legislation, as hindrances to promoting a culture of trust, which could ultimately lead to a 
failure of cooperation. 
Another significant cultural impediment to collaboration is the so-called “turfism” 
that exists in bureaucratic structures. Barriers to effective coordination include politicking 
and bureaucratic rivalries that stand in the way of interagency collaboration (Kettl, 2003). 
In a study investigating interagency collaboration in the Seattle region, Hagen (2006, 
p. 20) finds that “interdisciplinary rivalry and job performance cross-over can at times 
contribute to the perception of the existence of an adversarial relationship amongst public 
safety partners.” 
Analysis of published After Action Reports and post-incident briefs suggests that 
there are predictable surprises that can be identified in most planning efforts. The 
inevitable failure of a plan can be rooted in a poor pre-event planning process. Excluding 
key stakeholders limits vital input affecting performance outcomes. Discounting the 
importance of interdisciplinary coordination leads to gaps in operational or contingency 
plans. Failure analysis supports that there are contributing factures such as group think, 
peer pressure, and ego-driven decision making that direct the plan and outcome down a 
bad path (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). 
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F. OVERVIEW OF FIRST RESPONDER CULTURES 
Studies have shown how cultures of first responders—law enforcement, fire 
service, emergency management and public health (non-traditional first responders)—
differ and stress the importance of determining these differences in order to formulate 
recommendations for developing more effective collaboration behaviors and practices.  
Templeton (2005) summarizes in the key values in law enforcement officers, 
including perceiving themselves as “the ultimate responsible party” in major incidents, 
crime-scene responsibilities during major incidents, the tendency to work individually, 
and valuing independent action rather than teamwork. Policemen are ingrained in an 
organizational culture characterized by “lines of accountability, hierarchical aspects of 
supervision, and personal discipline. Chain of command structures are viewed as 
fundamental in organizational functioning” (Hagen, 2006).  
Bea (2004, p. 25) describes the organizational culture in emergency management 
as one that “thrives on networks, coordination, and organizational ties.” Emergency 
managers rely on their mastery of emergency plans, systems, and strategies. They 
specialize in weaving response agencies together and matching agency needs with 
capabilities. Unlike other homeland security disciplines, emergency management is 
perceived as one that “has no loyalty” and is founded on voluntariness. However, 
emergency management has had to constantly justify its existence and maintain its budget 
because of “job creep” perceived by the other first-responder disciplines. 
Firefighters are characterized as aggressive problem solvers who are eager to put 
their skills to work (Templeton, 2005). Fire departments are tradition-oriented and 
typically, firefighters are resistant to change. Firefighters tend to be territorial and prone 
to developing a view of being “owners and keepers” of the Incident Command System. 
Thus, distrust with the nonfamiliar is predominant in fire service culture. Unlike law 
enforcement officers, firefighters are teamwork-oriented and have the public’s high 




among fire service leaders and came up with the following: difficult egos, ignorance, 
adherence to traditional mindsets, competition for money, lack of opportunity to field-test 
plans, and difficulty funding equipment and training. 
Public health organizational culture is characterized by a less-defined hierarchy, a 
culture founded in science-based questioning, one that strikes a poor match with the 
“command and control” culture of law enforcement and the fire service. Unlike other 
first-responder agencies that are capable and accustomed to making immediate decisions 
absent complete data or information, public health officials are less inclined to do the 
same. It is this difficulty to immediately respond with sizable staff and resources to 
emergency scenarios that presents a challenge to public health. Butler, Panzer, & 
Goldfrank (2002) describe public health’s collaboration with other homeland security 
disciplines as a “strange bedfellows” situation. Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer of the Seattle 
police department suggests that interagency collaboration has forced public health to 
“think like cops and firefighters.” Hospital security shutdowns, decontamination issues, 
and quarantines have required them to operate in a new way (Hagen, 2006). 
G. STRATEGIES TO LEVERAGE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES IN LARGE-
SCALE EVENTS  
Public policy analysts and experts suggest several strategies to leverage and 
sustain collaborative behaviors in order to derive successful outcomes in the management 
of large-scale events and homeland security objectives.  
Quanterelli (1993, p. 10) suggests three basic strategies that “governments can 
mix and vary to create the desired organizational and social action in event of disaster.” 
These are: (1) build capacity among individuals and groups to protect themselves and 
their property, (2) allocate resources to assure continuity in organization structures and 
procedures, and (3) establish information infrastructure necessary to link individuals and 
organizations engaged in emergency activities together. These three recommendations, 
according to Quanterelli, will allow the “conscious design of an organizational network 
that can mobilize the relevant resources, knowledge and personnel to take appropriate 
and timely action under emergency conditions” (1993, p. 15).  
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Curda (2006) discusses the common practices that GAO found in its review of 
successful agency partnerships. These practices include 1) clearly defining the intended 
outcome upfront; 2) establishing mutually agreed-upon strategies that cut across agency 
lines; 3) identifying needs and resources; 4) establishing compatible procedures to work 
across agencies; 5) developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results; 6) integrating 
the collective collaboration strategy into the individual agency’s plan; and 7) paying 
attention to human-capital strategy. She further recommends using the PART tool and the 
President’s Management Agenda to support collaborative strategies. 
The HSE evolved from the shocking realities of 9/11. The 9/11 Commission 
report identifies the failure to collaborate as a contributing factor to the lack of 
coordination in the intelligence community (IC). In a 2003 blog, David Stephenson of 
Stephenson Strategies identified three strategies to encourage homeland security 
collaboration: sharing of resources, encouraging creativity and coordination within 
government services, and complete empowerment within the environment (Stephenson, 
2003). 
Turoff et al. (2004, p. 546) discuss the importance of a “trusted, collaborative 
system that can be used to support distributive decision making.” They state that no 
single information system used for technical interoperability is sufficient to address major 
disasters. Linking a variety of unexpected information sources will be the most possible 
scenario. The need to be equipped with timely and accurate information crucial in 
successful decision making becomes more critical in multiorganizational environments 
like the HSE.  
Bellavita (2007, pp. 4–7) reveals the cyclical nature of major event planning. By 
learning from annual mega-events like the Super Bowl, institutional or generational 
lessons can be found. Public safety professionals appear to discount this opportunity by 
ignoring key post-event findings. Structuring the planning process properly and accepting 
that the structure is dynamic and flexible with clear mission objectives lead to effective 
plans. These planners should ideally be the same people who will ultimately execute the 
plan within the established structure. Improvisation within the plan is required during any 
operational period of the event. Programming adaptation to changing event conditions 
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can help minimize frustration to planners and operators. It must be clearly understood 
that every plan will require shifts in priority or approach in order to react to variations in 
the event as it happens. Perhaps most importantly, threat-contingency planning requires 
extreme diligence to identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Secondarily, 
planners must accept that there will be no time when every man-made or natural risk is 
known. They must focus on what is historically known about comparable events and 
weigh that information against the current event environment. 
 The Cultural Task Force (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007) 
recommends ways to build and sustain a culture of collaboration among homeland 
security agencies under the leadership of the DHS. Three key recommendations focus on 
building trust, empowering components, and being a good partner.  
1) Building trust requires a clear definition of the DHS mission to partners 
and to the American people; establishment of performance metrics to monitor success; 
and sponsoring and leading DHS values and ethics. 
2) Empowering component agencies can be achieved by leadership meetings; 
alignment of goals with HS objectives; integrating within component organizations the 
best functionality, practices, and innovations of other components; actively investing in 
the activities, people, and strategy critical to the ability of component organizations to 
meet their goals; and sponsoring activities and initiatives that have enterprise-wide 
impact on performance.  
3) Being a good partner will require regular visitations and consultations to 
component agencies and administering grant programs in collaboration and partnership.  
4) Sustaining collaborative behaviors can be achieved at an individual level. 
Williams (2002, p. 3) lists values such as awareness and appreciation of the perspectives 
of others, showing interest in acquiring knowledge about others’ roles, responsibilities, 
problems and values, developing communication skills such as active listening, effective 
conflict management, and honing personal characteristics of openness, tolerance, respect, 
reliability, honesty, and trust.  
 29
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2004) emphasize that resolving incompatibilities 
within multiorganizational practices and procedures in the HSE requires decentralization, 
culture shift, and implementing joint education programs and training among first 
responders. Complex interagency problems can be addressed by decentralizing some 
operations to highly trained personnel whose standards and mindsets need to be 
integrated and deconflicted in order to achieve interagency interdependence. 
Collaborative values such as understanding, mutual respect, and trust are critical for 
optimal collaboration by operators in different agencies. Joint education programs, 
conferences, rehearsals, and drills build relationships among agencies, enhance mutual 
understanding of respective disciplines and promote collaboration.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Overview 
The research methodology included a review of scholarly literature and research, 
After Action Reports, government reports and documents, professional and academic 
journals, and multimedia news articles. It also included a review of nonscholarly 
literature, such as information from city and state Web sites and views of governmental 
and corporate representatives representing past Super Bowl host cities.  
Through a process of appreciative inquiry, the researcher set out to identify the 
elements and factors in an organization that enabled it to achieve success in the past and 
then build upon those elements and factors. By focusing on what made past Super Bowl 
planning processes successful and the parallels to the homeland security planning 
environment, the research intends to build upon those successes to create a positive vision 
of future planning methods.  
Because many of the same public safety representatives that conduct prevention-
and-preparedness initiatives within the HSE at the local level are required to develop 
comprehensive plans that can support the demands of mega-events such as the Super 
Bowl, perspectives of local planners who participated in Super Bowl planning was 
considered significant. 
A central goal of the research presented in this thesis is to determine how public-
safety responders can leverage successful planning processes to predict or improve 
performance outcomes during annual Super Bowls. Ultimately, it is hoped that a structure 
or guide can be offered to produce environments where event and incident performance 
can be predictably and reliably repeated. The following describes the methods used to 
design the research questions, the interview process, and how interviews were analyzed.  
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2. Process 
The qualitative research on annual Super Bowl planning efforts is summarized 
within the case study review. Interview responses were compiled to establish themes, 
lessons learned, and opinions. 
B. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Super Bowl XLII, held in Glendale, Arizona, was widely considered a best-
practice example for comprehensive public-safety planning within the modern HSE. The 
event required planning considerations very similar to those required during preplanned 
and high-risk homeland security events. These events are influenced by external and 
internal geopolitical, economic, and public-safety cultural factors. SBXLII took place in a 
post-9/11 planning atmosphere that required the consideration of the findings of the 9/11 
Commission Report. These findings helped to guide the philosophical and structural 
approach to risk-based planning and adherence to a “Unified Command” command-and-
control methodology (9/11 Commission, 2003, pp. 396–97).  
1. Interview Process 
The interviews were captured via e-mail and through telephone interviews. The 
interview questions were sent to original respondents in November of 2009. and follow-
up e-mails were sent during the response period, which lasted until February 20, 2010. 
All interview data remained confidential, with e-mail documents and notes from 
telephone interviews secured in the author’s private residence to meet IRB requirements. 
The integrity of the respondent’s standing within the first-responder culture was seen as 
central to the validity of the data received. A specific request was made to each 
respondent to utilize his responses as quotable material. When a respondent requested 
anonymity, his/her material was quoted as unidentifiable.  
The interviews were conducted in writing and via telephone. The respondents 
were well-respected experts on major event planning and were asked to provide their 
view on factors impacting major event planning. Specifically, they were asked to share 
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their perspectives on factors that lead to successful planning outcomes and elements 
within the planning experience that can be sustained. Additionally, the respondents’ 
perceived successful planning behaviors were queried, and they were asked to describe 
what they considered to be sustainable and duplicative methods for successful planning 
outcomes.  
2. Contributors 
The study of large-scale event planning included interviews with a specific group 
of professionals involved in annual Super Bowl planning. These individuals had distinct 
experiences related to this thesis. The interviewees were all considered to be leaders 
within major event planning, public safety and governmental agencies. Specifically, they 
had been assigned to strategic or tactical supervisory or management positions within 
their agencies. They worked for several different public-safety organizations, including 
local, state, and federal entities. They all had key roles in the planning, implementation, 
and contingencies related to major event planning including the Super Bowls considered. 
The interviewed subjects had many years of service in their respective agencies. The 
subject breakdown was: 
 2 Local Law Enforcement Representatives (state and federal). 
 2 Fire and Emergency Medical Services Representatives 
 1 National Football League Executive 
 1 Host Committee Executive 
A complete listing of interview questions and responses can be found in Appendix 
A. 
3. Analysis 
The interview results were closely reviewed to clarify the intent of each 
respondent. The interviewees’ answers were analyzed, and themes were identified that 
could explain how major event planning efforts can be improved and sustained. The data 
was assembled and categorized to reveal common themes or trends. These trends were 
further sorted to elicit specific actions or verbs such as trust, incentivize, etc.  
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Case study findings were analyzed and contrasted to establish key points and 
observations that could be supported by the literature or shed new light on the planning 
process of these marquee events.  
Summary findings of the response data was contrasted with known literature 
regarding sustaining collaborative processes during major event planning and within the 
HSE for the purpose of drawing conclusions between the surveys, case study, and the 
literature. From these conclusions elements of a “how to” manual for first responders 
who seek to avoid repeating past planning breakdowns might emerge.  
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A limitation of this study was the limited size of the sample group interviewed. 
The results may be considered prejudicial in that the respondents are accomplished 
planners who may have consciously or unconsciously eliminated many of the un-
necessary or counterproductive steps from the planning process. Similarly because the 
study does not consider smaller event planning, it may not reveal positive performance 
elements that could be applied to the major event planning environment. A concerted 
effort was made to include participants whose views may be considered as representing 
the opposition point of view. The author’s interpretations of the responses, and his 
personal bias based on a high degree of respect for each participant, should be considered 
by the reader. 
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IV. ARIZONA CASE STUDY 
The sources for a large majority of the following content are from a limited 
distribution, for official use only, after-action report that the author composed following 
SBXLII (Shannon et al., 2008). Leadership within the planning workgroup was solicited 
for their perspectives (Super Bowl Workgroup Participants, 2007). The author has 
interpreted those sources within this chapter and has cited specific sources when 
necessary.  
On February 3, 2008, Glendale, Arizona, hosted SBXLII. The annually planned 
event was the most watched SB to date with over 97.5 million U.S. viewers and nearly 1 
billion worldwide (Gorman, 2009). The annual high-profile event made it a very likely 
target for terrorism. SBXLII was best characterized as an Arizona event because of the 
comprehensive and highly collaborative statewide planning that distinguished it from any 
previous SBs. According to National Football League representatives, SBXLII was 
considered a model for conducting an inclusive and highly unified public-safety planning 
process (Supovitz, personal communication to the author, 2008). The following case 
study details the event elements that are relevant to this thesis. 
A. OVERVIEW 
In 2001, immediately following the 9/11 calamity, Phoenix hosted the New York 
Yankees in the World Series. The nation reacted to the terrorist acts by implementing 
heightened security measures that would pale in comparison to the measures that would 
follow in 2008. Later that year Glendale broke ground on what would later be named 
Jobing.com arena, a step that would begin the development of a central metropolitan area 
as a major sports and entertainment locale and ultimately lead to hosting the world’s 
premier sporting event. The transformation from bedroom community to sport and 
entertainment destination would elevate the city’s vulnerability to terrorism and other 




site of the Arizona Cardinals football team’s new stadium. Later that year, the city and 
state were awarded the 2008 SB after a statewide bid initiative led by then-governor Janet 
Napolitano (Economic impact study).  
Identifying the impacts to stakeholders and considering their needs would become 
the common theme in moving forward in future SB host cities (E. J. Klima, NFL 
subcontractor, personal communication to the author, 2008). The successful bid for 
SBXLII was accomplished through a cooperative statewide effort. Numerous 
communities adopted resolutions to secure the events for the state of Arizona. At the core 
of these resolutions was the obligation to assure public safety through unified, 
coordinated, and comprehensive law enforcement, fire and life safety, and emergency 
management services.  
When considered against central Arizona’s many infrastructure and military 
vulnerabilities, the exposure to terrorism that planned mass gathering events acquire 
greatly increased the need for comprehensive high-visibility event planning within public 
safety. 
B. THE PLANNING COMMITTEE 
A comprehensive plan was developed that included the first fully NIMS-
compliant structure used during a SB (Klima, personal communication, 2008). Past SBs 
have utilized variations of incident-command systems; however, a concerted effort was 
made by all participants to use the planning process as an opportunity to institutionalize 
NIMS in the Arizona public-safety culture. Coordinated public-safety and public-health 
efforts were implemented to assure base-level response to safety and security issues as 
well as the capacity to manage catastrophic events involving chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive ordinance (CBRNE incidents).  
Three committees were established to ensure effective planning and 
communication locally, regionally, and federally. The executive steering committee was 
comprised of state, county, and local heads of agencies or their designees to set policy for 
public-safety response. The public safety committee at large was represented by any 
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agency with a vested interest in SBXLII from throughout Arizona. The last committee 
was the primary SBXLII planning group and was made up of lead planners from each of 
the sanctioned host cities. Within the primary planning group, designated lead planners 
led regional public-safety outreach and acted as diplomats to the overall event-planning 
process. Central to that effort was an essential multiagency coordinating function led by 
public safety external liaison workgroups. These workgroups coordinated the Arizona 
public-safety efforts along with numerous other workgroups to form the comprehensive 
Arizona SBXLII planning team (Shannon, 2008). 
C. THE PROCESS 
The extraordinary level of oversight and involvement of NFL, their 
subcontractors, and regional and federal public-safety resources during SBXLII creates 
an unorthodox condition regarding event-to-incident potential escalation and the manner 
in which local public-safety resources that were ultimately were commanded and 
controlled. This condition is identical to the current HSE in that rarely do disasters, 
regardless of origin, impact a single jurisdiction, discipline or agency (Koenig, Dinerman, 
& Kuehl, 2002). Emergency management procedures typically involve defined and 
legislated methods of resource requesting and declarations for assistance. SBXLII and its 
associated events took place with the support and oversight of numerous state and federal 
agencies bringing the level of event management to the highest degree before an actual 
designation of the event as a National Special Security Event or NSSE. In other words, 
the event is preloaded with a resource cache that matches the threat or contingency 
requirements. This reality requires extreme coordination by county, state, and federal 
resources with local public-safety agencies outside traditional communication 
mechanisms within the emergency management process. This in no way meant that local 
emergency operations plans would be circumvented; it just required degrees of flexibility 





Figure 1.   Super Bowl Event Management Condition 
Dedication of resources to the preplanned events allowed for the assignment of 
staff and equipment in active command and control locations, staged resource locations 
and a tactical operations center (TOC). The TOC housed numerous law enforcement, fire, 
environmental, and public-health capabilities that could be deployed into the event 
footprint at any time during or within 48 hours prior to the game. As resources were 
requested by event command locations, and assigned by area command, the emergency 
operations center director was notified of the use of resources to assure their awareness of 
event status and the potential for requests for resources outside the dedicated pool. This 
differs from incident management models in that typically caches of equipment and staff 
resources are not available for deployment prior to a declaration of need by the local 
jurisdictions, counties, and states to the federal agencies. Under normal circumstances, 
command personnel begin requesting local response resources, and as the incident 
escalates, regional MOU agreements are implemented before local, county, and state 
EOCs make resource requests through a legislated declaration process. Figure 2 describes 







Figure 2.   Typical Flow of Requests during Large-Scale Incidents 
A level of “functional participation” existed by state and federal agencies in the 
execution of pregame security sweeps, intelligence acquisition, and sharing and mass-
casualty contingency planning that essentially infers an acknowledgment by the local 
jurisdiction that assistance is required to meet the mission goals and objectives for public 
safety. This represents the highest degree of participation in which state and federal 
authorities can participate without legislated declarations or event designation changes 
(e.g., going from a local or regional consequence event to an NSSE event). It is within 
that context that emergency managers and event planners were required to be in complete 
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agreement with the realism that these new public safety resources are now considered 
part of the intrinsic response capability of the incident commander and do not require the 
involvement of standard declaration procedures that would bring in state and federal 
assets. 
D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
As SBXLII and its associated events approached, several external factors 
impacted daily service delivery for the valley fire service. Seasonal population surge due 
to normal Arizona winter visitors and residents and the acute and chronic medical 
conditions that accompany those visitors would impact calls for service. Seasonal 
illnesses including influenza virus and upper respiratory infections typically peak in the 
region during the event period. Hospital diversion of admissions to emergency rooms is 
exacerbated to its fullest extent. Public-safety calls for service increased as a result of the 
above and established a baseline of increased burden to public-safety responders even 
before the first SB-related visitor arrived in the valley. 
E. EVENT PLANNING OBJECTIVES 
The planning committee collectively agreed to the following event objectives: 
 Provide for the safety of all event responders and staff.  
 Respond to all requests for service within event response footprints. 
 Assure the security of all event participants through a coordinated and 
well-communicated law enforcement plan. 
 Assure the rescue, treatment, and transportation of all patients within the 
response footprint. 
 Integrate local, regional, and statewide response capabilities into an all-
hazards approach to CBRNE incident management. Work in a unified 
manner with federal resources to assure the mitigation of all hazards 
regardless of cause. 
 Assure the comprehensive integration of all operational areas into a 
unified communications plan that includes VHF, UHF, 800 MHz, cellular, 
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satellite, and other technologies. Assure the method of communication 
(i.e., order model) is consistent with a NIMS-compliant organizational 
structure. 
 Assure representation in all regional incident management teams through 
assigned positions. 
Because of SB’s “preplanned event” nature, a complex event management system 
was designed with the ability to transition from “event status” directly into “incident 
status” through a modified Phoenix-metropolitan area Multi-Agency Coordination Center 
with embedded federal coordinating representatives. Escalation of the event to an 
incident would occur based on predetermined triggers such as chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, explosive ordinance (CBRNE) or mass-casualty events or a federal 
declaration of SBXLII to National Special Security Event (NSSE) status. 
Focused areas of the plan included: 
 Identify known sanctioned and unsanctioned events. 
 Coordinate all resources within the event footprint. 
 Unification of all command and control areas. 
 Assure effective coordination through public safety external liaison. 
 Assure public information coordination. 
 Multi-agency coordination 
 Logistical support of all operational areas. 
F. MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRIORITIES 
Because SB’s community impact is so large, numerous and sometimes conflicting 
priorities must be clearly defined and stakeholder objectives understood completely 
(Supovitz, 2005). For SBXLII the objectives were quite expansive but centered on the fan 
experience, emphasizing public safety throughout.  
SBXLII was much more than just a premier sporting event—it included numerous 
NFL-sanctioned events and other events that spanned the Phoenix area. Numerous other 
Arizona communities hosted sponsored events. These communities shouldered the 
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ultimate burden of providing comprehensive police, fire, and emergency management 
services during their events, but very few local communities could bear this burden alone. 
G. PRIORITIZING SPECIAL EVENTS  
SBXLII was largely supported by the local agencies. Still, federal resources such 
as the FBI worked in close coordination with local agencies to make sure intelligence 
information and other national interests met federal priorities. The highest designation a 
planned event can achieve is a National Special Security Event (NSSE). When the 
secretary of Homeland Security designates an event an NSSE, the Secret Service 
becomes the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security 
plan. The Secret Service has developed a core strategy to carry out its security operations, 
which rely heavily on its established partnerships with law enforcement and public-safety 
officials at the local, state, and federal levels.  
While SBXLII was not an NSSE event, it did rise to the level of a Special Event 
Assessment Rating (SEAR) of 1. Federal government involvement in non-NSSE special 
events is concentrated on those events designated as SEAR Level 1 or 2. An event is 
considered to be a SEAR Level 1 when it is an event of significant national and/or 
international importance that may require extensive federal interagency security and 
incident-management preparedness. Predeployment of federal assets as well as 
consultation, technical advice, and support to specific functional areas in which the state 
and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources may also be warranted. Arizona’s 
planning process embraced this designation and integrated federal representatives into all 
areas of the event plan. In order to ensure unified federal support to the local authorities 
and appropriate national situational awareness, a federal coordinator (FC) was 
designated, and an integrated federal support plan (IFSP) was developed.  
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DHS, including the office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) and the 
office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP), has developed a method for assigning a 
relative risk level to the multitude of special events nationwide that are brought to DHS’s 
attention by state, local, and tribal entities:  
The Federal Government cannot support every “Special Event” occurring across 
the 56 States and Territories of the United States. A request to be evaluated for a 
designated risk level is completely voluntary. Except in exceedingly rare cases, DHS 
does not evaluate events for their appropriate risk level unless the event was nominated 
by an appropriate state, local, or tribal entity. On numerous occasions, DHS’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis has reviewed and provided substantive input into a State and 
local produced threat assessment” (Rufe, 2008).  
H. NONPUBLIC SAFETY STAKEHOLDERS 
It is often forgotten that public-safety efforts include public health, public works, 
transportation, and environmental agencies. Additionally, NFL contractors act as liaisons 
with local police, fire, and EMS departments to assure comprehensive planning. The 
planning and execution of SBXLII would ultimately include more than 150 local, 
regional, state, federal, and private contracting agencies. Each of these agencies brought 
organizational structure, discipline-specific cultural mores, process, and procedure that 
needed to be taken into account as the design, construction, and execution of the plan 
occurred. Conflict did arise during this multiagency integration that required specific 
deliberation at the tactical and strategic levels of leadership. An example of this is 
detailed in the “Incident” section of this chapter. 
I. RELATIONSHIPS 
The relationship aspect of the planning process cannot be overstated. All partners 
in the planning process for SBXLII had brought a mutual respect and desire to work 
together. No stakeholder was excluded from the planning process. Some agencies 
appointed personnel to work on the plan who were less engaged than required by the  
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nature of their discipline’s contribution to the event. This required diplomacy and tact in 
resolving interagency disputes. An effort to manage disputes at the lowest level was a 
mutually agreed-upon tenet of the planning team.  
J. PLANNING STRUCTURE 
Three key multidiscipline and multiagency committees were established early in 
the planning process. Within each of these committees, emphasis was continually placed 
on maintaining a close and positive relationship with every stakeholder. The public safety 
committee at large was a statewide committee that invited all stakeholders to 
communicate their concerns regarding the plan’s design and implementation directly to 
the plan’s architects. A wide range of topics was managed from within this committee, 
from public-safety compensation to public-information strategies and labor relations.  
The executive steering committee was comprised of executive leaders such as fire 
chiefs, police chiefs, and department directors. This policy group approved all operational 
plans and the over-arching strategy. The committee related all policy-level issues to the 
local government leadership ensuring that the last group, lead agency planners, could 
work without influences from high-level management and elected officials.  
The lead agency planners made up the third committee and were the architects of 
the individual operational plans for law enforcement, fire and EMS, and emergency 
management. An additional vital player was the NFL liaison. This person worked as the 
conduit between the three committees and the NFL. This candidate must be a highly 
respected, highly collaborative, and well-known person among the agencies. 
Arizona appointed a planning committee coordinator to serve as the facilitator of 
the planning process and to pump information and resource connectivity to all the 
regions. The person selected happened to be an FBI special agent, which added a greater 
degree of connectivity to the federal resource element of the plan. Both the NFL liaison 
and the host committee representatives must be integrated into the local planner’s efforts. 
It is important to maintain a positive, cooperative, and trusting relationship throughout 
the process in order for it to be effective. 
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The planning process for SBXLII was based on regionally accepted and well-
established standard operating procedures, with an eye to scalability. These SOPs rely on 
the proven and reliable framework used every day in the Phoenix metropolitan area and 
have very few special procedures or response techniques designed specifically for event 
management. This ensured a simplified and predictable response to calls during the event. 
The response to SB-related events was not the time to try out untested methods. 
The Phoenix metropolitan area embraced the National Incident Management 
System. NIMS is an incident-based command structure, and that must be considered 
when designing an event-management system. There are clear differences between events 
and incidents, and management methodologies must anticipate the transition of a local 
event to a much larger regionally or nationally significant incident. That transition should 
be integrated into a unified effort that accounts for NIMS structure. Law enforcement and 
fire service planners fully integrated each other’s plans into a singular public-safety 
response plan. It was imperative that all response disciplines be incorporated into one 
command and control structure. 
Early in the planning process, basic ICS structure included the standard sections 
of operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. Within this design, 
intelligence, public information, NFL liaison, and safety disciplines were vital 
contributors to the incident commander’s management of the event.  
A critical element of the planning was the emotional and political reality of 
managing a local event with international impacts. To say that the SB is much more than 
a game seems a huge understatement. The art of diplomacy and tact during the planning 
process is absolutely requisite to balance local city management, elected officials, and 
citizen expectations against the regional, national, and international considerations that 
exist. The typical attendee on game day is usually someone who is associated with some 
well-connected person or corporation. This requires a heightened sense of political savvy 
when working events. The city of Glendale followed a simple philosophy that challenged 
each member to leave each customer with a sense of relief that he encountered a city 
representative. In the end, the planning process required a comprehensive and NIMS-
compliant method of event management that could transition to large-scale incident 
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management in an instant. For all the structure that as required in the planning process, 
there was an equal degree of flexibility needed for this very dynamic “thing.” Plans were 
progressively more tangible as the event start time neared but remained draft in nature 
until the beginning of each operational period. Within the operational planning design, 
there is adherence to the “Planning P” which builds-in tactical adjustments within the 
event operational period (NIMS, 2008). 
K. THE PLAN IN ACTION 
The planning of SBXLII closely followed tenets of the NRF, NIMS, and NPG, 
making it the most homeland security–compliant SB to date. Previous SBs included 
many elements of the ICS, but each fell short of the intent of HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 
during the planning of their execution. 
1. Operations Command Structure 
Event command at all event locations followed regionally adopted incident-
management standards as defined by the Phoenix regional standard operating procedures. 
In order to effectively manage personnel and resources, and to provide for the safety and 
welfare of the personnel, all personnel operated within the incident command system and 
specifically the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at the event location and 
within the over-arching incident command structure (Figure 3). This structure allowed for 
the seamless transition from “event” to “incident” status if the nature of the incident 
exceeded the capability of the dedicated resources to respond.  
Geographic designations of Scottsdale, Phoenix, and Glendale were supported 
through a complex incident-management system known as area command. Because 
SBXLII and its associated events were planned, dedicated resources were identified that 
event commanders could draw from as event needs escalated. Only when resource 
requirements exceeded those predetermined and authorized by the Multi-Agency 
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Coordination Center would the Glendale Emergency Operations Center be tasked with 



















































Figure 3.   SBXLII ICS Structure 
Area commanders communicated public-safety resource requests through the 
Phoenix regional Multi-agency Resource Coordination Center (PRMACC) embedded in 
a joint operations center. All other resource requests followed standard procedures for 
requesting resources within local emergency management emergency operations plans. 
these resource requests were made by area command based on detailed and specific 
information provided by individual event commanders.  
                                                 
1 The Glendale Fire Department and the region managed all SBXLII events with local resources; there 
was no request for pubic-safety assets to the EOC outside of those dedicated to the event. 
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2. Public Information Coordination 
The joint operations center (JOC)—specifically the Joint Information Center 
(JIC)—was responsible for the assignment of public information personnel on each event 
footprint. Coordination with the JOC and each city’s marketing and communications 
divisions took place throughout. In the event of an actual incident, as soon as practical, 
following basic event hazard-mitigation efforts, command was to establish an area-based 
information group. The establishment of this group would relieve command of the 
responsibility of dealing directly with the media during critical incidents and provide the 
standard information that the media requires to accurately report the emergency. Each 
jurisdiction’s public information officer (PIO) reported to area command throughout the 
event periods and interacted with information groups when established. All requests for 
service were monitored by the PIO’s who would assess the level of distinction that might 
be associated with the call or the customer. Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) requirements were satisfied at all times. Once the PIO had 
determined the degree of notoriety that might be associated with the call for service, 
levels of communication would be implemented to assure that 1) public safety was 
assured, 2) HIPPA rules were satisfied, and 3) city impacts were considered. Dedicated 
personnel were assigned to the JIC to act as liaison to the event PIO to assure that any 
information released by the JIC did not take place without consultation with the local 
marketing and communications department. 
3. Joint Operations Center 
A joint operations center was colocated with the PRMACC and was active from 
December 29, 2007, through February 5, 2008. Through monitoring and coordination, the 
PRMACC and JOC supported valleywide public-safety activities during the events. Each 
stakeholder public safety agency supported the occupation of the multiagency 




public-safety agencies. Overall asset control operations took place out of the unified 
event command center (ECC). The MACC maintained a supportive role for valley EOCs 
and ECCs throughout the SB.  
4. Emergency Operations Center 
Each event locale supported pertinent emergency support functions (ESFs) in the 
city’s EOC from Thursday January 31, until Sunday February 3, 2008. Overall public-
safety asset-control operations took place out of the ECC in each area command. The 
EOC maintained its supportive role throughout SBXLII events by staffing through “cold, 
warm and hot” operational periods.  
The fire service in the Phoenix metropolitan area is unique in that it operates as a 
single “automatic aide” consortium that literally deploys resources based on the 
escalation of an incident as defined by the incident commander without jurisdiction. In 
the event of a large-scale incident and the potential exhaustion of automatic aid resources, 
the city of Glendale would simply prepare declaration documents to formalize the 
statewide request for resources rather than facilitate their identification and mobilization. 
The state of Arizona Fire Service Mutual Aid compact is in essence “automated” and is 
activated through the Phoenix Fire Department Regional Dispatch and Deployment 
Center. These processes make the traditional resource requisition method within the 
emergency management culture less applicable to the fire service management of 
SBXLII. 
Law enforcement (LE) resources were coordinated in much the same way as fire 
and emergency medical resources, although no formal agreement exists that fully 
automates LE resources. Preplanned event procedures were designed and agreed upon by 
all participating LE agencies that essentially automated their use. 
It is important to reiterate that due to the “event” nature of SBXLII, NIMS-
compliant structure was designed that would ensure and facilitate the seamless transition 
from event to incident, should that be required, in compliance with the national response 
plan. Escalation of an event to incident status would rely on predetermined triggers (e.g., 
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mass-casualty incidents, CBRNE events, NSSE declaration, or exhaustion of resources 
requiring local declaration) and would result in a rapid transition from a local event 
through the state emergency management entity and ultimately into a federalized 
incident. Declaration documents were prepared by each SBXLII. 
Each jurisdiction hosting an SBXLII event designated a lead incident commander 
for its event. All other participating jurisdictions contributed staff, equipment, 
technology, and administrative support to the event as in kind resources unless previously 
agreed upon by an interagency contract. 
A true partnership between the National Football League and each event host city 
existed well before the planning of SBXLII began. This relationship continued without 
deterioration through the entire event. Ongoing, command communications with the NFL 
occurred via the NFL liaison. NFL command and control staff fully cooperated with the 
recommendations of public safety on matters involving logistical support, evacuation, 
threat management, and critical public-safety events. The NFL liaison was committed to 
all NFL/local or regional planning efforts and event management structures as the policy 
representative of public safety.  
5. Public Safety External Liaison (PSEL) 
Current and future SB host city fire representatives were supported by the PSEL 
group during their stay in Arizona. This aspect of internal customer service had never 
been formalized by previous host cities. Teams of informed public-safety service 
representatives (both sworn and civilian) hosted the assigned and unassigned observers 
from public safety agencies. This assured that public-safety agencies and guests would 
receive a high-quality exposure to the planning and execution of SBXLII. The PSEL 
group facilitated briefings, hosted meals, and provided access to venues, operational 
personnel, and facilities in a well-coordinated fashion. The PSEL liaison assured 
connectivity to the entire valley SB planning effort and served as the valley committee 
chair for this effort. This process provided the best opportunity for future SB host cities to 
gain the exposure they required while minimizing the impact to event operations. 
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6. Public Health 
All medical-care providers were connected to ongoing public-health syndromic 
surveillance via manual or electronic reporting mechanisms. Manual data collection 
occurred via field personnel from the University of Arizona College of Public Health. 
Data was then transferred from collectors to the EMS deputy chief on duty. after 
consultation with the public health advisor to area command and the EMS deputy chief, 
data was transferred to the Multi-Agency Coordination Center. 
7. Dignitary Medical Care 
Tactical Operations Unit (TOU) paramedics were used as requested through 
defined standard operating procedures for dignitary protection. A comprehensive briefing 
occurred between the TOU medics and the assigned sector officer related to extraction 
procedures, treatment plans, and transportation routes. TOU medics and TLOs acted as 
real-time liaisons between police and fire personnel and provided the most up-to-date 
information on developing situations. 
8. Mass Casualty Incidents (MCI) 
In the event of a major incident that would produce a multiple patient response, 
the first arriving EMS provider was responsible to size up the incident, report back to 
command, and follow standard operating procedures. The operations chief located within 
area command would work in coordination with unified command—specifically, the 
NFL liaison in the NFL control booth. That person would have decided, based on the best 
available information, whether a mass-casualty incident existed and, if so, would initiate 
the mass casualty plan. This plan is anchored in the statewide metropolitan medical 
response system, which serves as the current statewide all-hazards response plan. This 
plan is detailed in Emergency Support Function 8 of the state of Arizona Emergency 
Operations Plan. 
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9. Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) 
Terrorism liaison officers were incorporated into SBXLII planning early in the 
process. They performed threat and vulnerability assessments of each venue, analyzed 
intelligence data, and advised planners regarding security features of their plan. During 
events, the TLOs were embedded at on- and off-site tactical operations locations and 
remained ready to respond to any CBRNE incident. They operated under the direct 
supervision of the Intel section officer and were responsible for: 
 Creating a statewide network of personnel combining federal and state 
resources with local fire and law enforcement resources to provide a two-
way flow of information. 
 Establishing a link of current intelligence-gathering groups and providing 
a platform to share and collect information related to local and global 
terrorist threats and potentials.  
 Rapidly evaluating and disseminating information to response personnel 
including site managers and private-sector participants within the regions.  
10. Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Response 
During SBXLII events fire department special operations divisions utilizing 
walking assessment teams provided rapid assessment and detection for any intentional or 
accidental chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) incident. 
Certified HAZMAT technicians made up a portion of the walking team. The team carried 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection equipment, and worked 
in partnership with the Glendale Police Department (GPD) Explosives and Ordinance 
Disposal (EOD) teams, to provide initial analysis of any potential CBRNE incident. If 
detection analysis requirements exceeded the walking team’s capabilities, a request for 
the staged HAZMAT team would be initiated. If a greater response was requested, and 
the advanced capability was not required, the walking assessment team could de-escalate 
response through communication with the all-hazards branch officer. Deployment of all-
hazard teams was as follows: 
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 Sweeps: Prior to the event, a unified sweep team conducted preventive 
monitoring within and near the stadium entry areas.  
 Assessment: During the game all-hazard teams (AHT’s) were be staged 
adjacent to the stadium within the hard security perimeter. A HazMat 
supervisor equipped with surplus equipment was available for response. 
The teams were responsible for identification of and initial actions related 
to CBRNE events that might occur inside the stadium as an initial 
deployment resource. Each team coordinated response with the law 
enforcement EOD members of the AHT through the designated all-
hazards branch officer.  
 Exterior: During the game, staged HAZMAT teams provided coverage for 
all-geographical divisions outside the stadium. There were AHT’s in the 
exterior, plus a HazMat supervisor equipped with surplus equipment 
available for response.  
 Mass decontamination capabilities were staged in a secure location 
utilizing specialized technicians for both technical and nontechnical 
decontamination. Toxicology paramedics were available for rapid 
insertion into an event involving WMDs or mass-casualty events by 
utilizing MMRS assets, specifically 100 patient treatment modules. 
 Surety of communications within Special Operations occurred through 
800 MHz, VHF radio frequencies with encryption for security. 
 Toxicology medic teams were embedded with staged and on-site AHTs. 
These two-person teams are members of the AHT and assisted in 
providing coverage for all-geographical divisions outside the stadium.  
The all-hazard teams would locate, identify, and mitigate intentional or accidental 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents. Two 
certified consortium HAZMAT technicians made up a portion of each AHT. Each team 
carried advanced CBRN-detection equipment and worked in partnership with LE EOD 
members, to provide initial analysis of any potential CBRNE incident. AHTs would 
respond if requested by any official stadium personnel or the all-hazards branch officer. If 
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detection analysis requirements exceeded the AHT’s capabilities, a request for the staged 
full HAZMAT team would be initiated. If a greater response had been requested, and the 
advanced capability was not required, the AHT would de-escalate the response via the 
all-hazards branch officer. 
11. Decontamination Teams 
All sworn first responders are tasked to serve as gross decontamination 
technicians. During SBXLII, an innovative plan for gross-decon was designed that 
created a “virtual” decontamination corridor. Because physical space is a premium at all 
SB events, Glendale Fire Special Operations division management worked with HOK to 
work off existing water supply systems and cached hose bundles, which would allow for 
the establishment of decontamination corridors based on wind and event conditions. 
Decontamination teams from the National Guard’s 91st Civil Support Team and 
regional fire department HAZMAT resources were staged at an undisclosed location for 
response to an event at the stadium, but far enough from the venue to be excluded from 
the Hot/Limited Access Zone. Medical and technical decontamination would be managed 
by separate personnel.  
12. Technical Rescue Response 
Technical rescue response was designed to take place through the regional 
response system by utilizing prestaged rapid response teams (RRT) in the form of two 
six-person squads that would respond to any imminent or actual event. Crew make-up 
would include one safety officer, one squad captain, one squad engineer, and three 
firefighters. In addition, two canine search specialists were staged to respond with the 
squad to enhance search capabilities. Command would deploy teams to the scene through 
the Tactical Operations Center. An initial assessment by on-scene crews and an ultimate 
request for additional technical rescue services would be made through standard dispatch 
protocol. 
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13. Logistics Management 
The logistics section chief (deputy chief) led the unified logistics section. SBXLII 
required an organizational structure made up of a support function consisting of supply, 
ground support, and a facilities/service branch, which handled food, communications, and 
staff comfort. The supply component of this section ordered all event-related resources 
and supplies and was to receive, process, store, and distribute all supply orders. This 
included the handling of tool and equipment operations, which included storing, 
disbursing, and servicing of all tools and portable, nonexpendable equipment. The 
logistics branch set up, maintained, and demobilized all facilities used in support of event 
operations. A designated logistics center was established early on in the planning process 
and was equipped with storage, housing, office, and technology required to support 
logistical operations. Fire and police representatives provided unified facility 
maintenance and the security services required to support event operations from this 
location and on site. Frequent crossover occurred in which fire would support police 
needs and vice versa. Logistics set up all incident command locations, base camps and 
trailers, and other forms of shelter for use in and around the event area. Food, water, 
sanitation, and storage capabilities were assured by logistics.  
Partnership with vendors that provided equipment, services, and technology was 
accomplished through budgeted prioritization of needs and a phenomenal response to a 
solicitation of “in-kind” and/or demonstration opportunities for specific vendors to 
display their products and services in a “real world” application. 
14. Asset Management 
Support staff worked with asset management vendors to maintain primary tactical 
equipment, vehicles, and mobile ground support equipment. This group recorded all data 
related to asset tracking and usage and coordinated with operations and finance to assure 
functional and budgetary compliance. Requests for equipment took place in advance of 
the operational period of intended use when possible. A procurement procedure was in 
place to assure the adequate tracking of equipment.  
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15. Communications 
The public-safety community employed a common communications plan that was 
regionally connected and included event command post–based communication centers 
with tactical radio operators. These TROs were established solely for the use of tactical 
and support resources assigned to the events, to manage incident communications. A 
contracted communications specialist/manager assisted logistics division management to 
determine required radio inventories and frequencies and assure interoperability in all 
areas of event management. Landline and wireless communication requirements were 
coordinated with local, regional, federal, and NFL communications representatives to 
assure interoperability and frequency conflict compliance.  
16. Advanced Teams 
An advanced team task force was comprised of representatives from fire 
operations, the fire marshal’s office, the police, building safety, and code enforcement 
departments. This team was directly tied to the host committee and the NFL and 
responded to pop-up events that always accompany SBs. These events could be as small 
as neighborhood block parties of 100 to 200 persons to sponsored or promoted gatherings 
of several hundred to thousands of participants. The team ensured that all events within 
Glendale met all the requirements of city code and public-safety concerns. The team had 
the ability to “permit on site” if required and mandate minimal police, fire, and EMS 
resources to the event planners. This was unique to SBXLII and had not been a feature of 
previous SBs. The goal was to work with the pop-up event leaders to find a way for all 
parties involved to find a “win-win” scenario. Ultimately, the advance team had the 
authority to disallow any unscheduled or nonpermitted events in Glendale. 
L. THE “INCIDENT” 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, and those of the anthrax scare in 
October 2001, Arizona, much like the rest of the country, dealt with hundreds of calls for 
unknown substances. This was an extraordinary challenge because of the responding and 
responsible agencies’ lack of familiarity with procedures and protocols for incidents of 
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this type. Since that time, the FBI has clearly been designated as the lead agency in 
charge of any credible threat, but at that time there was little coordination between fire 
department hazardous-materials response teams, police department bomb squads, federal 
law enforcement, and state diagnostic laboratories. As a result of this experience, an 
Arizona statewide protocol was developed through a collaborative process that clearly 
identified through procedure and authority what steps were to be followed during local 
responses to incidents of this type. The Unknown Substance and Powder Protocol 
(USPP) project created an atmosphere of trust by facilitating the need of local responders 
to take some type of protective action in the interest of public safety while respecting the 
need for chain of custody by state and federal law enforcement and the Arizona 
Department of Health diagnostic laboratory.  
For months and years to follow, there was a sense of cooperation and 
collaboration between the first-responder community, the FBI, and state of Arizona 
decision makers that became the basis for cooperative participation in other efforts, such 
as mass-casualty planning efforts within the metropolitan medical response system and 
support for the Arizona-bound displaced persons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Stakeholder agencies sought the participation of impacted parties in the planning process 
of many events and projects. The deluge of federal funds awarded to agencies to enhance 
preparedness also included the requirement to cooperate in planning efforts, and the 
cumulative effect was that greater communication, trust, and performance were observed. 
The preparation and response to SBXLII would challenge planners in many ways, 
particularly in offering trust, being trustworthy, and diplomatically managing the lack of 
trust, or worse, certainty of malicious intent. When the key planning group formed for 
SBXLII, an emphasis was put upon identifying those persons who were important to the 
success of the planning process or, more importantly, who could obstruct the success of 
the planning process. Events of this magnitude impact the local municipality, regions, 
states, and federal agencies directly and therefore involve scores of stakeholders, each 
with their own goals. One such group was the “All Hazards Incident Response Team” 
planning team. This group would design and execute the prevention, mitigation, and 
response plans for hazardous incidents during all SBXLII-related events, regardless of 
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origin and type. Represented were chemical, biological, and radiologic, nerve agent and 
explosive ordinance (CBRNE) technicians and leadership. They were tasked to develop a 
seamless and unified plan that included response to incidents involving unknown 
substances (powders).  
Almost as though there had never been a collaborative process that led to an 
undisputed and agreed-upon process in 2002, these same planners were now lobbying for 
their own individual goals and objectives. This immediately caused dissent within the 
planning leadership and created factions within the technical-level group. The central 
issue was the desire of the first-responder group to have an on-site diagnostic capability 
to identify positive hits to air filtration systems being employed within the secured 
perimeter. The technicians’ argument was based on their need to have the ability to detect 
biological threats so that they could contain the exposures of any biological events. The 
position of state and federal authorities was that there was an agreed-upon protocol 
(USPP) that must be used. The credibility of the local responders (municipalities) was in 
question by the state (laboratory) and federal (FBI) authorities, who were basing their 
relationship with them on the trusting collaboration they had experienced in 2002 and 
2003. They questioned the integrity, intent, capabilities, and results of first responders 
and their methods. 
After much debate and understanding of the intent of the first responders to meet 
this enhanced risk (certainly different from that of 2001) with a greater degree of 
situational awareness via field diagnostics, a compromise was made wherein the first 
responder would be allowed to use the field analysis methodology it wanted in 
coordination with the 91st Civil Support Team of the Arizona National Guard, as long as 
it agreed not to act on any results without the expressed permission of both the Arizona 
Department of Health Services and the FBI Special Agent in Charge assigned to the 
event. The consequences of any variation from this agreement would have had substantial 
legal and political implications. 
During the SB game, between the second quarter and halftime, a routine analysis 
of the air filters with the field assay unit resulted in a positive finding for anthrax. The 
stadium was full; the entire SBXLII venue site was packed with team personnel, fans, 
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vendors, and media. The estimated crowd in and out of the stadium exceeded 150,000. 
With this level of import, the wrong decisions could have dire consequences 
operationally, politically, and financially. A second analysis took place between halftime 
and the third quarter, which resulted in a second positive finding. A sample had been sent 
to the laboratory for authentication between the first and second field samples.  
As expected, the tension was mounting within the command center at the thought 
of a mass prophylaxis plan being executed.2 Because all of the key stakeholders had 
come to the table in good faith and, though conflicted, were able to come to a mutual 
agreement that would assure the greatest level of information sharing, the most informed 
decisions would be made.  
Just prior to the conclusion of the game, results came back from the state lab that 
were conclusively negative, with a confirmation and description of why the field assay 
units were getting positive results. The entire all-hazards group knew that had they not 
proactively collaborated and planned, forcing themselves to work past the points of 
disagreement, a decision to react to field assay units could have had catastrophic 
consequences for the attendees, the event, the city, and the region. 
When there was disagreement, rather than devalue the relationship of trust, the 
stakeholders reinvested. They exhibited the positive, professional, and selfless behavior 
required to work the problem. Ultimately, they relied upon the relationship they had built 
years prior to gain the courage to trust the new dynamics they faced.  
                                                 
2 A comprehensive mass-casualty/mass-prophylaxis plan had been produced with resources physically 
manned and staged within a reasonable response time to the venues. MMRS resources were the basis of 
this plan. 
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V. RESULTS  
A. SETTING 
Host cities that hold Super Bowls create planning subject-matter experts (SMEs) 
annually by virtue of the expansive aspects of planning consideration that must be 
managed. The preplanned nature of SBs provides the most analogous condition to 
disasters in terms of the multitude of stakeholders, jurisdictions, and political 
contingencies that must be considered. This condition offers planners the ability to 
develop skills in the emergency preparedness cycle that include prevention (mitigation), 
planning (preparedness), response and recovery. SBs specifically provide an environment 
to replicate the planning environment within that cycle. Public-safety representatives can 
then evaluate and revise prevention and planning strategies prior to an actual disaster 
(Klima, 2008). These SMEs also have experience in public-safety planning and 
administration within the modern HSE in their daily job capacities. Considerations for 
major-event planning have clearly changed post-9/11 in both man-made and naturally 
occurring threat considerations and in the vulnerabilities that cities face. The vulnerability 
that Super Bowls present most commonly is due to their high-visibility, economic-impact 
potential and attendance by culturally and politically influential persons.  
This chapter reports the summary findings from the representative Super Bowl 
case study and interviews. SBXLII was considered a model example of Super Bowl 
planning in the post-9/11 HSE by NFL and associated agencies that identified several 
best practices during the event. Challenging lessons learned from both SBXLII and 
unspecified past Super Bowls that were conducted after September 11, 2001 are also 
included. 
Interviews were conducted including three high-level SB planning representatives 
who are part of annual SB planning and three representatives who were involved in the 
planning of two SBs. Their direct responses can be found in Appendix A of this 
document. Excluded are the summary notes from phone interviews that were conducted 
to help contribute to the thesis results.  
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The findings represent interpreted factors that the respondents believed enabled or 
detracted from successful planning processes. The respondents received two surveys, the 
first intended to reveal important factors impacting SB planning and the second intended 
to help rank known SB planning obstacles that were identified during the first interview 
process.  
B. RESULTS 
1. Successful Planning Processes 
Questions 1 and 1a asked the respondents to consider the elements that contribute 
to or detract from creating a successful event during major-event planning from both a 
public-safety and event-management perspective. From the responses, it is clear that 
comprehensive and cooperative interagency participation is key. Great effort must be 
taken to include all stakeholders in the planning process regardless, of the degree of 
impact any one particular element of the plan may have on their disciplines. The plan 
must be an executable document not just a “paper plan.” 
Successful planners have a plan for any particular event contingency. They 
recognize that large events require attention to detail. Understanding the systems, people, 
equipment, and technologies that make up an event and being prepared to reconcile any 
weaknesses in any category are vital. Each discipline (police, fire, EMS, PW) must 
examine its own standard operating procedures and processes and mitigate its 
weaknesses. This requires full acceptance and participation in a NIMS-based unified 
command process where the designated IC is supported by a homogeneous command 
staff that represents the key stakeholders. During SBXLII discipline-specific planners 
would conceive of every possible hazard contingency in a structured setting where all 
threats were discussed and prioritized.  
Involving the stakeholders as early as possible in the process establishes a 
foundation of “buy in.” This can be done by creating environments where stakeholders 
can get to know each other under nonevent conditions such as orchestrated social 
gatherings. In these settings, team synergy can be established and assessed for 
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effectiveness. In Arizona, the lead planner fashioned social opportunities for key event-
planning personnel in order to facilitate familiarity and a sense of value for each other, 
beyond the event-planning contribution. In the event that disconnect exists between team 
members or disciplines, steps can be taken to minimize the impact or perhaps provide the 
impetus for changing the player mix.  
Appreciation for chain of command communications is a central tenet of 
successful planning. Each team member must know to whom he reports and must 
maintain a strict adherence to that relationship. During Super Bowl planning there are a 
number of activities that are occurring at the same time. The opportunity for inadvertently 
circumventing the chain of command is high. For this reason, it is critical to maximize 
communication between the command level and the tactical and task levels of plan 
management and execution. Planners must be disciplined in avoiding reporting structure 
“hopping” or “shopping” for answers. 
2. Value of Nonpublic Safety Stakeholders 
Respondents felt that there is an inherent value to including the perspectives of all 
those impacted by the event. While all respondents agree that inclusion of all 
stakeholders is essential to meeting the goals and objectives of the event, this was 
emphasized more powerfully by the representatives from the National Football League, 
host city leadership, and affiliated agencies. Inclusive multidisciplinary and multiagency 
planning in the HSE and during Super Bowls offers three principle benefits: 1) it allows 
entities to influence the course of events by determining in advance the actions, policies, 
and processes that will be followed; 2) it guides other associated preparedness efforts 
such as continuity of operations and integration of finance and administration into the 
planning process, and 3) it contributes to unity of effort by giving a common approach for 
executing operational procedures during the event (DHS, 2008).  
Planners must create an effective balance between stringent public-safety 
prevention and response procedures and assuring a favorable fan experience. Venue 
planners often have a broader view of the key issues that impact the event. This view 
must be considered in terms of executing the prescribed plan. An example of this during 
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SBXLII was the strategy to contact patrons who set off radiation alarms at the secured 
entry points for venues. The general population visiting Super Bowl venues includes a 
diverse mix of age groups and demographic categories. The population includes those 
who have had medical procedures performed using radiologic isotopes. These isotopes 
have a prolonged half-life that includes the emission of radiologic elements. During the 
venue entry process at SB venues, fans are inspected for weapons or IEDs and radiologic 
devices. The hazardous materials technician’s mission was clear: to identify, track, and 
isolate any potential WMD threat. SBXLII fans who had experienced medical procedures 
including nuclear medicine would generate an extraordinary amount of interest from the 
Glendale hazard assessment teams (GHATs). Upon contact with a radiological emitter, 
each GHAT member prioritized customer service and extreme diplomacy while 
determining the threat potential. Adhering to Occam’s razor, the technicians, supervisors, 
and command personnel would work from a premise of medical isotope until proven 
otherwise.3  
It was widely agreed that nonpublic-safety stakeholders must participate in pre-
event table top and functional exercises with public-safety providers in order to reveal 
plan vulnerabilities. Disputes over jurisdictional authority and the prioritization of public 
safety in contrast to fan experience should be expected and solutions sought out prior to 
open conflict.  
3. Improving Performance Outcomes 
At the core of effective planning and operational performance is a committed and 
shared focus on partnership. All the respondents rated shared goals and expectations as a 
high requirement during the planning process. This is supported by the literature 
specifically in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, where unified prevention and 
response to man-made (including terrorism) and naturally occurring disasters is 
emphasized through preparedness planning and preparedness efforts (see Chapter II, Part 
B). Obvious displays of partnership and engagement in the process were considered 
                                                 
3 Occam’s razor posits that the simplest explanation that explains all the data or strategy tends to be the 
best one.  
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contributing factors to establishing a regional reputation for being a good host city. This 
has been a vital recommendation by the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which 
affirmed in 2003 that “states are encouraged to employ regional approaches to planning 
and preparedness and to adopt regional response structures whenever appropriate” in 
order to meet identified homeland security needs (DHS, 2004a, p. 35). 
Event organizers, local and regional government, and adjunct agencies must be 
conspicuously present in all phases of event design and plan execution. Respondents felt 
that this helped with morale of planners and operators by demonstrating approval and 
overall endorsement of the work product. This is supported in the literature review where 
the absence of leadership leads to teamwork dysfunction and potential withdrawal to 
more jurisdictional perspectives (GAO 2003; Abbott & Hetzel, 2005). Because the 
majority of planned events and incidents are mitigated by those who have had a hand in 
the construction of the plans, there was less concern by respondents that public-safety 
first-responder’s ability to execute the plan was being considered. 
Commitment to NIMS-based and well-organized ICS structure is vital throughout 
the mega-community that is a Super Bowl. Respondents emphasized the need for law 
enforcement to embrace the new ICS paradigm. This includes all local, county, and state 
law enforcement as well as private security representatives present in the event. The FBI, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 
USSS, and NFL security have yet to effectively adopt NIMS structure as the uniform 
method command and control of staff and resources. This leads to gaps in performance at 
the planning level and can create great obstacles during response to events and incidents. 
Respondents felt that scenario-based table-top exercises with each stakeholder present 
would lead to ICS skill development and greater confidence amongst disciplines.  
Both the literature and surveys exposed the requirement of flexibility and ability 
to adapt to changing event and incident environments. A respondent used a sailing 
metaphor as he cited the need to use the planning structure as the “keel” that keeps new 
information guided within the overall goals and objective but to know when to engage in 
“tacking” and make adjustments to the plan with the destination always in mind. 
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The respondents felt the post-9/11 HSE has seen a greater degree of collaboration 
amongst stakeholder agencies. In relation to Super Bowl planning, a respondent felt that 
top performing cities had a history of effective collaboration. The addition of heightened 
security measures illuminated areas where public-safety disciplines were working well 
together and where they needed improvement. Some respondents felt that federal grant 
funding and the NIMS training requirement acted as a vehicle for improved planning and 
operational performance, but collectively they agreed that things were better.  
4. Positive Planning Behaviors 
A respondent described very succinctly the categories of contributing personality 
types in the major-event planning process. He said, “There are those that make things 
happen, those that watch things happen and those that wonder what happened.” A 
resounding theme in the interviews, the case study, and the literature is the need for 
action-oriented and level-headed thinkers in the plan design and execution of major 
events and incidents. Super Bowls and the modern HSE require detail-oriented, low-ego, 
selfless commitment to the group’s priorities. The consummate planner contributes to the 
dialogue and debate but does not get distracted from the mission objectives. He has a 
sense of knowing the balance between open-minded information gathering and decisive 
leadership.  
5. Politics and Mega-Event Planning 
Each respondent acknowledged that, in order for stakeholders to contribute at 
high levels, they must feel a sense of relevance and contribution to the greater whole. 
Political jurisdictions must cooperatively pass legislation and resolutions that assure 
collaborative and cooperative contingency planning. Leadership must maintain its 
standing as a player-coach and mentor. Building around the strengths of the collective 
personnel on the planning team can lead to a sense of greater contribution. Holding 




and organizational leadership can contribute to the dialogue demonstrates the inclusive 
nature of the plan. Ownership in the event or incident is more likely when the participants 
feel they have been given the chance to truly communicate.  
Incorporation of the event incident commanders early in the planning process is 
vital to seamless transition from planning to execution. This is in part due to the 
likelihood of greater performance at the operations level and also to avoid pressure on the 
planners to devise a plan that ICs feel comfortable executing rather than one that meets 
the mission criteria. One respondent stated, “Oftentimes the people involved at the 
planning level are inhibited by politics at the command level.”  
C. COMMON SECURITY PLANNING PRACTICES 
Respondents and study results suggest that major-event planning and homeland 
security consequence or contingency planning have many similarities. These similarities 
allow for the distillation of the most effective approaches to multijurisdictional and 
multidisciplinary event planning into a best practices strategy. Dr. Christopher Bellavita 
relates in a September 2007 Homeland Security Affairs article that “all Olympics are 
different. All Olympics are the same.” His contention is that there are enough security 
planning elements in major event planning that can be used as potential templates for 
planning future events (Bellavita, 2007). The Super Bowl planning process exemplifies 
this position in that from year to year there are a base set of public-safety requirements 
that are contrasted against the backdrop of national and international security conditions. 
The results of interviews and case study data suggest the base steps:  
1) Commitment of public safety resources and infrastructure by the host 
city 
Each SB city engages in a community-wide effort to solicit the award of the 
annual event. In doing so, the host city or region must demonstrate its political, 
jurisdictional, and community interest in holding the event and demonstrate the economic 
and resource capabilities to safely carry out this comprehensive premier event. Security at 
the event is of paramount importance. Host cities recognize the international attention 
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that SBs garner and the elevated threat and vulnerability potential to terrorism that comes 
with the event. Within the HSE, communities must commit politically, financially, and 
socially to hardening their city’s vulnerabilities to intentional and accidental catastrophes 
by matching public-safety and security capabilities against the anticipated threat.  
2) Establishment of a local SB host committee and planning structure 
The host committee serves as the over-arching support mechanism to local 
planners and stakeholders. The organizational structure of the typical host committee 
matches that of the DHS in that it includes strategic, tactical, and task-level 
organizational layering with defined leadership in each position.  
3) Individual and interdisciplinary planning 
Historically, the NFL and host committee have selected a law enforcement 
representative to lead the public-safety efforts. Respondents disclosed that those persons 
have had particular autonomy in decision making for stakeholder disciplines, which has 
at times added a degree of tension between law enforcement and fire agencies in the 
planning process. In some SB cases, it has created divides in the collaborative process 
and led to gaps in the plan. Recent SB host committees have taken great steps to select a 
lead public-safety representative who is known for his collaborative and cooperative 
reputation.  
In the case of SBXLII, the public safety community came together well before the 
planning process and established a planning structure that could be communicated 
through a primary “voice” that spoke for the group. That voice would require a proven 
history of diplomacy and political savvy in a variety of public-safety settings. An ad hoc 
group of sanctioned NFL event cities recommended this individual because of his 
unquestioned reputation as a leader who lets subject-matter experts do their jobs. 
Commander Mike Orose of the Arizona Department of Public Safety was that designated 
voice and confirmed throughout the planning process and event execution that his 
selection was the right decision. 
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Each city must establish effective response plans within an all-hazards 
framework. The plans must complement each other and be managed within a proven 
incident command structure that assures seamless transition from planned event to 
incident. The plans were assembled into an overall event-management approach that is 
anchored in a strong ICS.  
4) Coordinated communications systems 
According to respondents and the literature, soon after September 11, 2001, the 
dysfunction of interoperable radio communications was a top priority for the entire public 
safety community (9/11 Commission, 2003, pp 396–97). The NFL had previously 
addressed the issue of radio-frequency identification from an event production 
perspective in order to avoid disrupting the broadcast of events. Some efforts had taken 
place to identify, secure, and share public-safety radio frequencies, but they fell short of 
true interoperability. Aside from resolving technical interoperability, the language of 
communication has remained partitioned by discipline with some positive steps toward 
true interoperability taken by Jacksonville, Florida in 2005. There, lead planners made 
efforts to unify the communications process through a common language to be spoken 
during the event so that public-safety responders from different disciplines would 
understand commands more clearly. In Arizona, the communications subcommittee 
established interoperable frequency designations by discipline. Each discipline 
committed to strict adherence to NIMS-based nomenclature as they executed individual 
plans. 
5) Regularly scheduled event planning meetings 
While seemingly obvious, the importance of regular and meaningful meetings 
with event stakeholders at the strategic, tactical, and task level was highlighted by 
respondents almost uniformly. Understanding the strategic goals of the event and 
discussing those goals and potential impacts with the policy group is vital. During 
SBXLII, Arizona planners created an executive steering committee that would endorse 
strategic goals for the event. Lead agency planners would craft tactical objectives to be  
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executive by task level operators. This process was important to establishing a sense of 
ownership in the event plan and gave numerous opportunities to identify possible 
conflicts in intended service delivery methods. 
Preceding SB mentoring “shadowing” served to facilitate actual event 
experiences. Key future Super Bowl host city planners are assigned to their respective 
counterparts in the current event city and observe the planning process firsthand. One 
respondent identified the lack of a NFL-approved template for minimum contingency 
planning as a fundamental weakness in the annual planning process. While the mentoring 
process is highly effective in establishing a sense of scope of the project, especially if the 
planners participate in the summer, fall, and winter planning meetings, there is still 
potential for less-than-standard planning schemes annually because of the lack of an 
approved template. Overall, the respondents’ “journeyman” planner process is a positive 
approach to major event planning. 
D. ANOMALIES/DIFFERENCES 
A number of unique elements were identified in the planning of SBXLII. First and 
perhaps foremost was the selection of an NFL liaison who could represent the interests of 
the public-safety community in the Phoenix metropolitan area without appearing to—or 
actually to—give strategic direction to the group. This varies from the annual designation 
of a lead public-safety decision maker primarily from a political perspective. Individual 
disciplines have been historically able to implement the degree of service delivery they 
desire, but the internal politics between disciplines have been at times contentious. 
Credentialing, planning structure, communications, and command and control of 
resources are critical areas for high-level collaborative efforts. The personality type and 
reputation (autocratic or collegial) of the lead public safety representative can positively 
or negatively set the tone for planning experience. 
The Public Safety External Liaison (PSEL) was a first for Super Bowl planning. 
Considered a “best practice” by the NFL and host committee respondents, this event 
concierge managed the mentoring process described in Section 5. In order to avoid 
inconsistent exposure to venues, planners, and command and control elements of the 
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event, the PSEL hosted in-state and out-of-state public-safety representatives. They were 
hosted with a focus on comprehensive exposure to the planning, operational, logistical, 
and financial impacts of a mega-event like Super Bowl XLII to individual agencies and 
the region. This program gave all interested parties the greatest chance for involvement 
without tasking operations personnel. 
SBXLII planners designed and executed a NIMS-compliant, truly unified 
command and control of the events with police, fire, emergency management and public 
health agencies. According to NFL and contract respondents, this had not been fully 
accomplished in the preceding SBs. The entire state contributed to the public safety 
response to SBXLII regardless of the event’s impact on their own jurisdiction. This was 
both a result of limited resources in the Phoenix metropolitan area and a desire to include 
as many public-safety agencies who were interested in participating. Planners continually 
acknowledged that a chief precept of the planning process was to establish relationships 
for the future planned event or disaster. The desire was to leverage professional 
relationships to enhance service delivery. The Phoenix public-safety community realized 
early on that no one agency could support all the required services for an event such as 
SBXLII. An open invitation was extended to literally all Arizona public-safety providers 
to participate in the planning and execution of the event plans. State agencies such as the 
Department of Health Services, Office of Homeland Security, Department of Emergency 
Management and Radiation, and Arizona Radiological Agency were active partners who 
provided both equipment and staffing resources. Vendors provided their products for 
demonstration and utilization, and also provided staff and technical support to ensure 
success.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A basic premise of this thesis was the assumption that the planning process and 
execution of public-safety procedures during annual Super Bowls closely resemble the 
preparation, prevention, and execution of homeland security programs and processes. The 
fundamental question was asked, how does the public safety community leverage 
successful planning processes to predict or improve performance outcomes in annual 
Super Bowl planning?  
The following recommendations were developed from the analysis of case study, 
interviews, and surveys conducted for the thesis. The perspectives of the respondents, 
emerging themes from the interviews and surveys, and review of SBXLII case study are 
the basis for these recommendations. These perspectives and themes can best be 
summarized around six core goals: 1) a collaboration-based planning structure, 2) an 
understanding that the public-safety mission is vital to supporting the over-arching 
mission of the event goal (fan experience), 3) true unification of multidisciplinary plans 
into a single NIMS-based all-hazard-oriented event plan, 4) institutionalization of the 
culture of preparedness, 5) a commitment to accountable, flexible, and inclusive 
leadership in the planning process, and 6) public/private partnerships in preparation. 
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Need for a Collaboration-Based Planning Structure 
Collaboration is the foundation of any meaningful group project. Each contributor 
must see mutual benefit in the planning process. Layers of policy, strategic, tactical, and 
task-level oversight should be embedded by representatives who have proven experience 
in working in groups. The structure must be formed to unify the group’s capacity to deal 
with terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. By embracing a common 
set of guiding principles and reporting structures, from the planning leadership to the 
frontline planner, a singular event planning focus can be realized.  
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Coordination and cooperation among disparate partners from the homeland 
security world must be joined with a clearly stated purpose and mission, as well as buy-in 
from the public-safety executives and agency heads. 
2. Understanding That the Public-Safety Mission Is Vital to Supporting 
the Overarching Mission of the Event Goal 
Super Bowls are far more than a championship football game. They represent the 
world’s premier sports and entertainment experience with over 100 million viewers and 
200,000 event attendees annually. At its foundation, the event represents the culmination 
of a season-long struggle between two NFL leagues in a deciding game. But their true 
importance is a celebration of iconic and elite sport and popular U.S. culture. This is both 
the game’s greatest attribute and vulnerability in the post-911 homeland security 
environment. It is the very setting through which terrorists desire to gain notoriety by 
their potentially catastrophic acts.  
The fan experience is of paramount importance to the NFL and the host 
committee. Public-safety providers are similarly focused on the sport enthusiast but 
cannot let prevention or planning processes overwhelm the ability of fans to experience 
as much of the event as possible. A balance must be met between event security and 
negative public perception. Systems must be established to facilitate speed of access, 
freedom of movement, and overall safety within the context of the homeland security 
threat potential as it exists at that moment.  
3. True Unification of Multidisciplinary Plans Into Single NIMS-Based 
All-Hazard-Oriented Event Plan 
Following September 11, 2001, the 911 Commission recommended that, when 
multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved in a response effort, a unified 
incident command process should be established. What later developed as the National 
Incident Management System is an excellent tool that should be utilized by all 
participants of the Super Bowl planning effort. The reasons for this are two fold: 1) SB 
host city public-safety agencies participating in the event have been required to comply 
with NIMS training in order to receive DHS grant funding. The local jurisdictions have 
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jurisdiction, command, and control of all assets assigned to the planned mega-event. 
Federal public-safety agencies will support the host city effort with staged resources but 
do not have authority unless there has been a federal declaration that the Super Bowl is 
considered a NSSE event. 2) In the event of a transition from mega-event to an actual 
incident, the resources that would be deployed to assist (e.g., urban search and rescue, 
disaster medical assistance, and public health teams) arrive and operate within a NIMS-
based all-hazards incident-management team structure. 
NFL representatives and affiliated agencies should all be trained in NIMS 
structure and have clearly identified roles and responsibilities in the event of a disaster. 
NIMS provides a systematic approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector for the management 
of incidents. 
4. Institutionalize the Culture of Preparedness 
It is vital that potential Super Bowl host cities establish a culture of preparedness 
as a core feature of their bid to be awarded the event. The NFL should require that 
bidding cities submit proof of compliance within the guidelines and philosophy of the 
National Response Framework and the NIMS. Such proof would come in the form of 
acknowledgment by regional FEMA administrators that the bidding city and region is 
compliant with all the requirements for NIMS. Additionally, the NFL should adopt NIMS 
as the foundation for its event command and control process with clear unification with 
the established NIMS-compliant event public-safety command structure. 
5. Commit to Accountable, Flexible, and Inclusive Leadership in the 
Planning Process 
Leadership must distinguish between coordination and collaboration through their 
actions. They must have the orientation, ideology, and motivation that leans toward 
inclusive and flexible management of people. They must be visible practitioners of 
collaborative planning processes. Appreciation for individual disciplines in the SB 
planning process and their operational needs is requisite. Leadership must realize that 
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optimizing performance in personnel is a balance of poetry versus prose. Motivating 
personnel to give their best requires leadership that puts personnel in positions based on 
their skill strengths and an acknowledgment that even the most secure individuals need 
ego massage and reassurance during the planning “battle.” Ideally, the foundation for 
successful collaboration has been established by the leadership group prior to the event-
planning period but when it has not, a high priority must be made of bolstering 
collaborative capacity within the planning group. 
Leadership should be selected from known public-safety representatives who 
possess the political diplomacy, technical command and control, and motivational skills 
required to maintain progressive movement toward a successful planning outcome. 
B. PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN PREPARATION 
It is apparent that the private sector and other nongovernmental agencies play 
both vital and varied roles in Super Bowl event planning. It is not an exaggeration to state 
that the contributions of businesses in mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery 
activities are underestimated. From occupying positions on the host committee to 
assisting with tactical and task-level planning and operations, the private sector interacts 
frequently with the public sector to fulfill necessary community disaster-preparedness 
functions. The public sector relies heavily upon the goods and services provided by the 
private sector. Many functions could not be adequately performed without the assistance 
of the private sector.  
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While forty-four Super Bowls have taken place since 1967, each has been planned 
and conducted within a context of varying economic, geopolitical, and public safety 
conditions. Further study is required is to determine whether a standard format should be 
applied to mega-events that require multijurisdictional or multiagency response in terms 
of planning design and NIMS compliance. Research should be conducted from the event-
management point of view. 
There should be additional research on the integration of public and private event-
management entities into a singular planning format. Because much of the research data 
in this thesis was qualitative and appreciative in nature, a more quantitative review of 
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A. INTERVIEW METHOD 
Several respondents were contacted via e-mail and telephone to solicit their input 
in this research. Five key representatives within the planning process agreed to be 
interviewed. They were selected because of their broad perspectives on the goals and 
objectives of Super Bowl planning. Each had served very specific functions during 
multiple or single SB events that offered insight into the effectiveness of cooperative 
planning and operations. Two respondents came from high-level management within the 
National Football League and three were from associated host committee or public-safety 
agencies that dealt most commonly with public-safety responders. They were queried as 
to their perspective that included the following essential themes of SB planning: what 
factors contribute to effective public-safety collaboration within the Super Bowl planning 
process? What counts as a successful Super Bowl from a public-safety perspective? How 
can organizations duplicate positive performance outcomes in planned events or incident 
environments? How can planners predictably continue the positive experiences in 
successive events? 
The respondents received two surveys, the first was intended to reveal important 
factors impacting SB planning, and the second was intended to help rank known SB 
planning obstacles that were identified during the first interview process. The first survey 
questions were: 
1. What is a successful planning process? 
2. What is the importance or value of event (i.e., NFL) venue (Stadium, host 
committee) management to the planning process? 
3. What are the steps hosts of the event can take in the planning process to 
improve performance outcomes during the event? 
4. What is it in the planning process that translates into improved 
performance outcomes during the execution of the plan? 
 90
5. Has collaboration (between public-safety providers) been improved since 
9/11? 
6. Are there personality types or behaviors that lead to more predictable 
planning processes during SB’s? 
7. How do you keep the planning group correctly oriented? 
8. Should the process be flexible or well structured? 
The second survey asked the respondents to rank the following impediments to 
interagency collaboration during SBs: 
1. Development of an efficient plan for sustaining collaboration will be 
costly and time-consuming. 
2. Differences in public-safety cultures or attitudes between agencies tend to 
quash efforts at collaborating. 
3. It is not clear what roles first responders should assume in interagency SB 
planning. 
4. Even if the public safety activities are carried out at different times, there 
are disputes over the places in which they should engage in these 
activities. 
5. Public safety agencies lack a unified plan for sharing responsibilities. 
6. First responders have felt let down, burned, or defeated by past efforts to 
collaborate. 
7. First responders of one agency have come to resent competitive behavior 
from first responders of at least one other agency. 
8. Lack of a unified language between first-responder agencies is an obstacle 
for creating a plan for collaboration in the first place. 
9. Some distrust between first-responder agencies has developed over time.  
10. There are disputes about the order in which first-responder activities 
should be carried out. 
11. There are disputes over jurisdictional authority.  
12. There is a lack of individuals from different agencies who are willing to 
participate in developing a plan for sustained collaboration.  
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13. There is often miscommunication or misunderstanding of information 
between first responders.  
14. Those interested in planning sustained collaboration have not given 
adequate attention to the concerns of those who would be held responsible 
for carrying out plan objectives (i.e., first responders). 
15. Additional questions queried interagency dynamics related to sustaining 
collaborative planning efforts, specifically the urgency respondents felt 
regarding interagency planning.  
B. AGGREGATE RESPONSES FROM SURVEYS 
1. What is a successful planning process? 
 
Respondent 1: Have a plan for any particular contingency. Recognize that large 
events require attention to detail. Understand the systems, people, 
equipment, and technologies that make up an event and be prepared to 
reconcile any weaknesses in any category. Each discipline (police, fire, 
EMS, PW, etc.) must examine their process and mitigate its weaknesses. 
Appreciation for chain of command communications is a central tenet of 
successful planning. Minimize the communication disconnect between 
event command and the tactical elements of the plan. 
Respondent 2: The plan has to be an executable document not just a “paper 
plan.” 
Respondent 3: Involve the stakeholders as early as possible in the process. Create 
environments where stakeholders can get to know each other. Identify if 
the team is working effectively together and if not make changes EARLY. 
Respondent 4: Comprehensive and cooperative interagency participation is key. 
Full acceptance and participation in a Unified Command process where 
the designated IC is supported by a homogeneous command staff that 
represents the key stakeholders. 
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Respondent 5: A Successful planning process assures that all stakeholders are 
heard and have sense of buy-in to the process. Leadership is collegial 
NOT authoritative and is known for their contemporary planning style. 
 
2. What is the importance or value of event (i.e., NFL) venue (stadium, 
host committee) management? 
 
Respondent 1: Participants can demonstrate this during pre-event table-top 
exercises where procedures and process are evaluated. 
Respondent 2: Keep in mind the importance of the goal of the event is to create 
an enjoyable fan experience. Create an effective balance between efficient 
public-safety prevention and response procedures and assuring a favorable 
fan experience. 
Respondent 3: Planners must keep a perspective on the overall goals of the event 
while assuring effective plans in their own jurisdictions. 
Respondent 4: Venue planners consider a wider range of issues than do the event 
management or public-safety planners. 
Respondent 5: They have the global perspective. They bring the public/private 
partnerships to bear in the event-planning process. Their perspective is 
more fan “experience”–oriented than public safety planners.  
 
3. What are the steps hosts of the event can take in the planning process 
to improve performance outcomes during the event? 
 
Respondent 1: Establish a committed and real focus on partnership between the 
event organizers and the local/regional government. Be conspicuously 
present in the process of planning. Taking positive steps to establish the 
reputation of being a good event partner can result in positive economic 
and public relations outcomes. Incorporate as part of the plan a process for 
making the city look good, understanding that it is an investment in the 
future of the city’s host reputation. 
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Respondent 2: Keep it simple; jurisdictions oftentimes make the event planning 
process more complex than it needs to be. Commit to effective 
communications process and methods. 
Respondent 3: Make sure that all of those impacted by the plan are involved in 
the planning process. Include political, governmental, and entertainment 
representatives. 
Respondent 4: Make sure there is effective communication. Good information 
being managed through the chain of command both up and down the chain 
keeps participants on the same page. Because there are societal 
expectations of responsibility on elected and appointed officials, make 
sure they understand and endorse the plan.  
Respondent 5: Communicate. Write plans that are realistic. Talk to the operators 
of the intended plan to gain their perspectives. 
 
4. What is it in the planning process that translates into improved 
performance outcomes during the execution of the plan? 
 
Respondent 1: Table-top exercises help demonstrate everyone’s readiness and 
understanding of the goals and objectives of the event and the plans 
associated with it. 
Respondent 2: Commit to a well-organized Incident Command System (ICS) that 
is National Incident Management System (NIMS)–based. Law 
enforcement must embrace the new ICS paradigm. Planned events offer 
experiences that help bridge the gap between planned major events and 
unexpected incidents. 
Respondent 3: Preplanning with other cities improves performance. Scenario-
based table-tops are helpful to testing the plan. Making those table tops 
comprehensive in discipline scope (police, fire, public health, public 
works, etc.) as well as the policy makers increases the likelihood of 
confidence in the plan an any possible issues that might develop during the 
actual event. 
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Respondent 4: By constructing the planning process in the same way that an 
actual incident would develop, skills can be acquired that will translate 
into more effective command and control of major planned events such as 
Super Bowls and actual large-scale incidents like hurricanes, earthquakes, 
etc. 
Respondent 5: No response. 
 
5. Has collaboration been improved since 9/11? 
 
Respondent 1: Top-performing cities always collaborated. Since 9/11 more 
specific procedures are in place to assure security that requires close 
coordination to make sure the goals and mission of the event are met. 
Respondent 2: The pendulum may have swung too far in the prevention realm, 
and whether or not collaboration has been improved is largely the result of 
leadership in the locales and their commitment to collaboration. There are 
some areas where police and fire don’t work together well due to cultural 
differences (organizational and institutional). 
Respondent 3: Collaboration in public-safety planning has greatly improved 
since 9/11. Arizona has specifically demonstrated a high degree of 
cooperation and commitment to effective large-scale event planning. 
Respondent 4: Prior to 9/11, only those frequently affected by disasters 
appreciated the value of cross-disciplinary collaboration. Post-9/11, there 
has been a large commitment to the effective and efficient use of resources 
and to avoid duplication of effort and operational performances that is 
contrary to Unified Command. 
Respondent 5: No response. 
 
6. Are there personality types or behaviors that lead to more predictable 
planning process? 
 
Respondent 1: Detail-oriented, cool-minded leaders are required. Knowing the 
balance between open-minded information gatherer and decisive 
leadership is key. 
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Respondent 2: Those personality types that create opportunities for a better 
product are desirable. Contributing to the dialogue but not distracting the 
team from the objectives. 
Respondent 3: Cooperative, low-ego, team-oriented, trustworthy, and confident 
personalities help. 
Respondent 4: Low-ego, selfless commitment to the team and not personal gains. 
Avoidance of turf wars or authority issues and the setting aside of any 
jurisdictional priorities lead to a better planning process.  Delegation of 
authority to a single agency representative helps streamline the 
collaborative process by avoiding the “I agree but let me check with my 
boss scenario.” 
Respondent 5: Collegial, inclusive, low-ego-type personalities. Clear planning 
objectives and direction from leadership. 
 
7. How do you keep the planning group correctly oriented? 
 
Respondent 1: Acknowledge that everyone participating in the process is making 
an important contribution. Be an effective coach and mentor. Create a 
sense of team through effective listening and embracing the opposition 
point of view. 
Respondent 2: Have clear goals and objectives. Build around the strengths of the 
personnel. Embrace new ideas. Hold people accountable for doing their 
job. Acknowledge people for their efforts. Respectful appreciative 
interaction goes along way. 
Respondent 3: Move the meeting locations into each stakeholder’s jurisdiction so 
they feel a part of the process. Give formal leadership of agencies the 
chance to speak at meetings. Emphasize partnership. Emphasize the 
regional nature of the impact of the event to keep stakeholders oriented 
toward the bigger picture and not just their own jurisdictional needs. 
Respondent 4: Give a sense of ownership in the planning process. Recognize 
people for their efforts. 
 96
Respondent 5: Start each meeting with a gant chart that shows where you are and 
where you want to be. Continually speak to the stakeholders to determine 
if their objectives are being met and that they understand where the 
planning process is headed. 
 
8. Should the process be flexible? 
 
Respondent 1: Be flexible; adapt the process to the conditions. 
Respondent 2: Be aware of external and internal factors affecting collaboration. 
Respondent 3: Stay consistent with the planning structure. It will give 
participants a degree of predictability in the process. 
Respondent 4: Different phases of the planning process may require different 
tactics. Adapt to the conditions. Early in the process emphasize 
understanding of the goals and objectives by everyone. Later in the 
process tailor the planning process to the key issues affecting event 
performance. Making sure that the plans reflect the available resources 
and the likely requirements for use is important. 
Respondent 5: Absolutely, multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary planning 
inherently requires flexibility. 
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